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Yardsticks for Workers Rights:
Learning from Experience


Introduction

About the database
Background
Definitions
Need for reliable measurements
Difficulties of measurement
What analysis can show

The global sweatshop issue is evolving from promises to proof – from getting major multinational corporations to pledge that their products will not be made under sweatshop conditions, to finding out whether those pledges are actually being kept.

As this shift occurs, it brings up a very practical question.  What pieces of information are needed to show what the working conditions actually are, in any particular workplace located anywhere in the world? In other words, what should count as proof that companies are meeting their promises?

A multinational company selling consumer goods like clothing can use hundreds or thousands of factories around the world to make its products. Up to now, the problem of getting any information at all, from so many different workplaces, has tended to overshadow the problem of whether the right kinds of information are being sought. But figuring out the right measurements, measurements that can reliably show whether working conditions in a specific workplace do or do not meet pre-agreed standards, is critical.

Several efforts are underway to specify some or all of measurements that should be taken.  Companies trying to watch over their own contractors and suppliers, sweatshop critics trying to document abuses, and a variety of monitoring organizations offering their services are each using their own sets of measurements, sometimes taking the shape of  questionnaires that monitors visiting a factory are asked to fill out and procedures they are asked to follow. But there is no widely accepted form and no consensus.  The state of the art is experimental at best.

The purpose of this analysis is to advance the state of the art, by looking at every unit of measurement currently being used by any participant in this field; identifying particular strengths, weaknesses, and best practices from that collective experience; and offering potential improvements. The analysis uses a database we have constructed, and put on the internet for public use, to make the many scattered pieces of this collective experience easy to find, sort, and compare. 

Our findings are summarized in Highlights and detailed in sections that separately cover each of the major topics of workers rights. The findings are based on our analysis of current measurement practice, but we invite readers to use the database for their own purposes and to draw their own conclusions. We hope that a clear view of experience to date will help every participant in this process to improve on current practice, to recognize key measurement limitations and compensate for them, and to move toward  more uniform measurements that all participants on all sides can use. Without standardized yardsticks,  the process of proving that global companies are keeping their no-sweatshop promises, or breaking them, will not be able to advance far.

About the database

Our researchers compiled 2,900 individual units of measurement being used in this field, from 100 different sources ranging from individual companies and industry groups, to monitoring organizations, to non-governmental watchdogs, to the International Labor Organization. We then organized them in a database with many different searching and sorting capabilities, to make it as easy as possible to find and analyze current measurement practice on any particular subject and from any particular angle. The database itself includes a full description of its purpose, content, and methodology.

Background

In the last decade, public outrage over extremely abusive working conditions revealed to be occurring in the production of such familiar products as sport shoes, soccer balls, and clothing in general has turned into a strong demand for multinational corporations to take responsibility for the treatment of workers who make their products.

Looking for the quickest, cheapest ways to produce labor-intensive goods in a global economy, those companies have been moving much of their manufacturing to low-wage countries where even basic legal protections for workers are non-existent and where union organizing is strongly discouraged or prohibited. The result is that millions of the workers the global economy uses– typically, women and children – are subjected to conditions far below what international labor rights standards call for.

As the public learned about these conditions through the media, attention focused on the brand-name companies involved and created pressure on them to be accountable. Recognizing the importance of labor rights as basic human rights, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights devoted itself early on to pursuing mechanisms of corporate accountability for labor rights.

A number of companies have responded to public pressure by adopting codes of conduct,  which set out basic workers’ rights and workplace standards for their suppliers and contractors to follow worldwide. Some have also required their suppliers and contractors to submit to monitoring to determine their compliance with the new workplace codes. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights played a major role in helping establish and develop the Fair Labor Association, a non-profit, multi-stakeholder organization made up of industry, non-governmental organization (NGO), and college and university members, operating an independent monitoring system to hold participating companies accountable for compliance with a uniform workplace code of conduct. 

Definitions

Monitoring involves the collection of information about particular workplaces, and to be credible it needs a system of measurement. [1] The measurement process asks questions, gets answers, and holds those answers up against a defined code standard. It can be broken down into separate subjects, such as Freedom of Association or Health and Safety, but in each case the three key elements are the same.  To describe these three elements, this analysis uses the terms units of measurement, measurement results, and code standards respectively. 

Units of measurement.  These are the many different yardsticks that an observer could apply, the defined pieces of information that the monitoring process is supposed to collect. For example, to help determine the degree of fire safety, one unit of measurement might be the width of the aisles on the factory floor. Another might be whether fire exits are unlocked. In effect, units of measurement  are the questions that the process is meant to answer (“How wide are factory aisles?” or “Are all exits unlocked during factory hours?”).  Units of measurement are meant to be the same from one case to the next: asking the same questions each time is part of a consistent process of evaluation.  This analysis refers to each separate piece of desired information as a separate unit of measurement. A 62-item set of questions for Fair Labor Association monitors to use during their factory visits [2] is thus a collection of 62 different measurement units.  Each of the 2,900 items in our database, collected from a wide range of different sources, [3] is a unit of measurement.

Measurement results. These are the answers, in specific cases, to the questions posed by units of measurement.  If the measurement unit is “width of factory aisles,” the measurement result in a specific factory might be “44 inches wide.”  Measurement units are the yardsticks; measurement results are the readings taken with the yardsticks. Results will vary from workplace to workplace; units stay the same.

Units of measurement are much more likely to be disclosed to the public than measurement results, particularly when the source is a company or industry. In general, companies find it much easier to disclose the list of items they are looking for, as evidence of workplace conditions, than to disclose what they or others have actually found:  “we want to know the width of the aisles,”  but not “the aisles were 44 inches wide in factory A; 31 inches wide in factory B”; etc. Independent observers like non-governmental organizations do not feel the same constraint, and to date they have been the public’s main source of measurement results for individual workplaces. But NGOs’ measurement activities tend to be limited, understandably, to only one or a handful of workplaces. Only one-third of the units of measurement we identified in our research were accompanied by actual measurement results in the sources we derived them from, and most of those results were for a company’s operations only in the aggregate, or for conditions in an entire country, rather than for an individual factory or other specific workplace. The database shows the details.

Code standards. These are the criteria for compliance with workplace codes of conduct that are set out in the codes themselves. In effect, they are the promises that companies are making – what they say their workplaces will be held to. Code standards are easy to locate, but they nearly always come in general terms such as “Employers shall provide a safe and healthful working environment to prevent accidents and injury to health . . . .” [4]   How to apply them case by case is the key practical question, requiring much more detail in the form of units of measurement, monitoring procedures, rules of interpretation, etc.  The ambiguity of code standards can create problems in determining whether they are being met, even when reliable measurement results are available. See Difficulties of measurement below.

Indicators.  The term indicators is often used in monitoring to describe characteristics of a workplace that are particularly significant in determining whether code violations are occurring. In effect, indicators are an intermediate step between individual units of measurement and overall code standards. Indicators tend to be derived from a number of individual measurement units taken together. For example, analyzing the proportion of women to men in the lowest-wage positions in a factory, the comparative success of women and men in being promoted and in earning higher actual wages over time, and other such statistics can produce a strong indicator of possible discrimination on the basis of gender.

Defining indicators in terms of their measurable components is a step that is often neglected, even though it is a necessary part of generating indicators that are reliable. The definitional problem cannot be resolved by simply defining the indicator itself as a unit of measurement (e.g.,  “Is there discrimination?” (record 805), since all that does is to shift the problem onto the shoulders of the monitor. [5]

Reliability is defined and discussed in Elements of Reliability.

Need for reliable measurements

To be effective, monitoring needs to produce information that can be dependably used to gauge the degree of compliance in any particular workplace with defined workplace standards. The information itself needs to be reliable, of course. It also needs to be in consistent form, gathered using standardized methods from workplace to workplace and from country to country so that compliance determinations are consistent and comparisons between workplaces are fair.  These needs put a premium on defining the units of measurement that the monitoring process will use.

Findings based on consistent measurement of workplace conditions against fixed standards were not needed to begin the international movement against sweatshops. The early exposes that launched major public concern were based on conditions so outrageous that they would have failed any imaginable set of measurement criteria. Abuses were so blatant that measurement was not necessary.

Once code standards were adopted, however, attention had to shift to the question of whether those standards were being complied with, case by case. On the line between compliance and non-compliance, inevitably, there are finer distinctions and more subtle offenses than the ones that first made headlines. In answering compliance questions, obviousness is no longer a sufficient guide.

One imperfect way of answering compliance questions is simply to trust the judgment of on-site investigators. Select the individuals carefully, send them out to specific factories or other workplaces, and then rely on them to combine what they see, what they hear from talking to workers and others, and their own “know it when I see it” intuition into an informed personal conclusion as to whether standards are or are not being met. Conceptually, this is much easier than trying to figure out each of the pieces of information that would be needed by a third party to reach such conclusions independently. “Trust the on-site observer’s judgment” has therefore been a mainstay of workplace evaluation so far, both for companies and for their critics.

Faith in a monitor’s judgment can only go so far, however. As the number of workplaces to be evaluated grows, from a handful at first to many hundreds for even one multinational corporation, more and more different monitors need to be employed. Inevitably their skills, experience, and judgment will vary, to the point at which findings of compliance or non-compliance may depend more on the choice of monitor than on the facts of the case. An approach that puts a high degree of faith in the monitor’s intangible abilities forces the debate to be about the monitor’s credibility, instead of about the facts in the particular case. But endless debates about credibility are what the fact-based approach to monitoring was meant to overcome.

For these reasons, monitoring programs have increasingly tried to specify the information that they are gathering to support their conclusions, using checklists of facts that monitors are required to establish during a factory visit, questions they are required to ask of workers or managers or others, procedures they are required to follow in selecting people to interview, and so forth.  The use of consistent measurements and systematic procedures gives onlookers more confidence in the integrity of monitoring programs. It also allows a monitor’s findings to be spot-checked by someone else, when those findings are called into question in a particular case. In other words, the need to define  units of measurement has been recognized, and a number of attempts are underway.

Difficulties of measurement

Using a measurement process to determine code compliance is both complicated and controversial.  Early failures have fed the controversy.

The practical difficulties are several. Some code standards, and the workers’ rights in international law on which they are based, are inherently difficult to measure against. They are framed in broad conceptual terms, which need to be converted into measurable components before they can lend themselves to pass/fail assessments, much less to the application of anything like a 1-to-10 scale of compliance. Even when standards are articulated sharply, measurement can be difficult because in many situations, perception plays as significant a role as concrete fact. And even when standards and measurement units are precise and concrete, weaknesses in the monitoring process may undermine the ability to collect reliable measurement results.

Framing of standards. The code standards for workers’ rights now being applied, and now requiring measurement for compliance, are grounded in the fundamental rights articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [6] in 1948, beginning with the right not to be discriminated against (art. 2) and the right not to be held in servitude (art. 4).  The rights of workers, set out in intentionally broad terms, include

  • the right of everyone “to just and favourable conditions of work” (art. 23(1));
  • the right to “equal pay for equal work” (art. 23(2));
  • the right of “[e]veryone who works to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human right dignity…” (art. 23(3);
  • and the right “to form and to join trade unions for the protection of [the worker’s] interests” (art. 23(4)).

These broad terms are elaborated on with more specificity in other labor rights and human rights instruments, particularly in conventions of international labor law adopted both before and after the Declaration itself. [7]  What it means to have just and favorable conditions of work, fair remuneration, freedom of association, and nondiscrimination (among other fundamental rights) has been given considerable attention. But difficult issues of interpretation and measurement remain, and the difficulties vary from subject to subject.  “How safe is safe?” in the context of  workplace norms is a question being answered fairly well by increasingly detailed standards cast in concrete, measurable terms, such as parameters for ventilation, temperature, and lighting; unlocked exits; machine guards; protective clothing; and the like. “How fair is fair?” in the context of wages is a more troublesome question, with various formulae for calculating fair wages having been proposed but no consensus on what the formula should be, or even on the appropriate elements that a formula should include. “How free is free?” in the context of freedom of association is not only a difficult question to reduce to measurable formulas, but the practical problems involved have received notably less attention from current monitoring efforts than the similar practical problems raised by other workers’ rights topics.

The sections that follow, analyzing measurement progress in each specific area of workers’ rights, offer many illustrations of this problem. The problem tends to be most acute where there is most resistance to interpretation of workers’ rights in line with international legal standards. Some code-of-conduct standards, for example, call for  “freedom of association” in general terms without specifying the right to form and join trade unions, [8]   even though the right to form and join trade unions is explicitly at the heart of the international standard.

As well as failing to acknowledge the explicit contents of established international standards, resistance can also take the form of failing to deal with key issues posed by an established standard. Again using freedom of association as the example, the international standard is cast primarily in terms of the right of workers to form and join trade unions. In weighing compliance with the right to freedom of association where unions are barred by the state, should any form of organization other than an independent trade union be taken into account; and if so, how?  Disagreement on approaching this critical issue, discussed at length below, [9] has stood in the way of articulating clear code standards for freedom of association – much less translating them into measurable terms -- for a majority of the workplaces that codes are intended to cover.  

Perception.  In some areas of workers rights, such as Abuse and Harassment, perceptions are especially important and in practice are central to defining a violation of code standards.  For example, if a gesture or word directed toward a female worker is perceived by her as having a sexual connotation that creates shame or fear, that perception is a key element in determining if sexual harassment has occurred. Context, cultural and otherwise, also needs to be taken into account—for example, a gesture or word that would be innocuous in one context could constitute harassment in another [10] --and context varies widely from place to place. Following the Health and Safety model and generating a set of fixed criteria for sexual harassment (e.g., gesture A in country Z constitutes harassment under conditions 1, 2, and 3) could offer some guidance but would be very unlikely to capture the reality of sexual harassment violations.  Instead, measurement needs to address the  workers’ subjective experience directly. Measuring what workers perceive can be done, but making those measurements of subjective information reliable takes special techniques, both in data collection and in correlation with information from other sources, which are time- and resource-intensive and which most monitoring schemes have not systematically developed or incorporated. [11]  

Measuring perception is also essential whenever worker intimidation and fear are involved (see Monitoring), as they very frequently are, no matter which area of workers rights is being addressed. Freedom of Association is a particularly sensitive area, since violations of free association rights and intimidation of workers so often go hand in hand.

Weaknesses in monitoring process. The collection of measurement results by a monitor can also be unreliable for a number of other reasons, discussed in Elements of reliability.  Experience is full of examples of monitors being lied to, mistrusted, misled on purpose or by accident, or simply misunderstood. Monitors can also miss key facts due to their own lack of training, experience, diligence, motivation, access, or time. Figuring out which units of measurement are more and less reliable when applied in the monitoring process, and for which purposes, is no easy task. For example, when monitoring for potential violations of the right to freedom of association, a key source of information is most often unavailable. Union organizers and representatives tend to be the most sensitive detectors of violations; but where unions are barred and access by organizers to the unorganized labor force is denied, there will seldom be any such witnesses to consult. Since this is the most common situation in the global workplace, it makes it especially difficult to monitor successfully in the area of freedom of association, even apart from definitional uncertainties.

Finally, measurement is also made more difficult by skepticism about the monitoring process in general, which in a few conspicuous cases has had its weaknesses dramatically demonstrated. [12] Some monitoring skeptics fear that measurement creates an illusion of rigor in a process that is inherently flawed. Others, who support monitoring, believe that units of measurement cannot capture the important subtleties in violations of workers rights, and that pursuing questions of independently reliable measurements will distract attention from the importance of choosing the right monitor.   

 What analysis can show 

Taking an overview of current measurement practice will not make the difficulties of measurement in this field disappear. It can, however, point to the most effective ways to reduce those difficulties that have been tried. It can also suggest how much farther those successful techniques could be taken. Indirect indicators can sometimes be effective where direct measurement is not, for example. Seeing whether the right incentives for reliable measurement are in place can often be as important as the particular measurements themselves.  

Dividing the compliance question into its component parts and looking at each systematically can make it easier to identify measurement problems and potential solutions. Many of measurement’s difficulties are specific to only one topic or only one kind of measurement unit. Approaching problems topic by topic avoids the fallacy that sweeping, across-the-board solutions are the only ones that will work. Specific solutions  targeted to specific problems can go far. For monitoring skeptics, the step-by-step approach can also help focus attention on where the most serious residual problems may lie and what kinds of solutions would be likeliest to help. Having a clear sense of the different components of reliability can also help in recognizing whether a potential solution is addressing the real nature of the problem.  

We suggest possible improvements in each topic area, but not with any sense of having identified the optimal or ultimate set of measurements in any case. Our purpose instead is to illustrate the possibilities, drawing heavily on current experience and offering relatively simple extrapolations from it. If this analysis stimulates others to go farther and improve on our findings and suggestions, moving toward wider understanding and agreement on measurement’s potential and the nuts and bolts of its implementation, our goal will have been achieved.



Endnotes

[1] See Need for reliable measurement

[2] FLA Monitoring Guidelines, available at Query Page (search for source “FLA Guidelines”).

[4] Fair Labor Association, “Workplace Code of Conduct,” available at http://www.fairlabor.org/all/code/index.html (accessed 9/7/03).

[6] General Assembly of the United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 2024), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (accessed (10/28/03.)Standards for workers were first set out in international law in 1919, in six conventions adopted by the first International Labour Conference following the formation of the International Labour Organization. Those standards, now for the most part superseded, dealt with hours of work in industry, unemployment, maternity protection, night work for women, minimum age and night work for young persons in industry.  See International Labour Organization, “ILO History,” available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm (accessed 11/3/03). 

[7] The full list of the approximately 180 Conventions of the International Labour Organization is available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/whatare/stndards/index.htm (acessed 11/3/03).  The first six of these conventions were put forward by the ILO in 1919; see note 6 above.

[8] See, e.g.,  Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production, “WRAP Production Principles,” in Production Facility Self-Assessment and Monitoring Handbook, p. 8 : “Manufacturers of sewn products will recognize and respect the right of employees to exercise their lawful rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining.”  Available at http://www.wrapapparel.org/CertLetterAttachments/HandbookEng.pdf (accessed 11-3-03).

[12] See, e.g., O’Rourke, “Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC) Labor Monitoring,” available at http://web.mit.edu/dorourke/www/PDF/pwc.pdf (accessed 9/7/2024).


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