A Fragile Peace:
Laying the Foundation for Justice in Kosovo

Photo credit: Jeffrey Prescott A home in Prizen that was burned after the Serb family living there fled Kosovo. We were told that several homes each week are burned after Serb families are forced by threats and intimidation to leave the province.

Preface

In an August 1999 report, entitled "Kosovo: Protection and Peacebuilding; the Protection of Refugees, Returnees, Internally Displaced Persons and Minorities," Human Rights First highlighted the urgent need to protect the physical security of minorities in Kosovo, among other human rights concerns. Filling the vacuum resulting from the absence of an effective legal framework and functioning civilian institutions, including the justice system and police, was identified as one of the fundamental challenges facing the international civilian administration in Kosovo.

Building on the findings and recommendations of its earlier report, Human Rights First carried out a second mission to Kosovo from September 25 to October 3, 1999, to assess the international community’s efforts to establish the rule of law in Kosovo, and, in particular, to clarify the applicable law, establish an independent and impartial judiciary, and ensure effective policing capacity.

Human Rights First delegates were Sibylle Kapferer and Jeffrey Prescott. The mission visited Pristina, Mitrovica and Prizren. The mission held meetings with staff of the Civilian Affairs component of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); the Council of Europe; KFOR; the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); various local and international non-governmental organizations, and a number of Kosovar judges and practicing lawyers, including members of the Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Measures.

On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council placed Kosovo under international civil administration and military protection. This step marked the end of a humanitarian tragedy in which thousands of Kosovar Albanians were killed in the course of ethnic cleansing by Serb forces and tens of thousands more were subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture, rape, and other human rights crimes. As a result of these wide-scale human rights abuses, more than 800,000 Kosovars fled as refugees, and perhaps 500,000 more people were displaced within Kosovo.

Following the end of the NATO bombardment, the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, and the installation of UNMIK, there was a mass return of refugees at a scale and speed that is historically unprecedented. By the beginning of August 1999, almost 90% of the Kosovar Albanians who had fled the province since March 1998 returned, including the vast majority of those who had sought refuge in neighboring countries. Over the past two months, more than 72,000 refugees have also returned to Kosovo from countries outside the region.

On the other hand, large numbers of Serbs and Roma, as well as other minorities, have left Kosovo, many prior to the refugees’ return and many as a consequence of events and developments that followed it. It is estimated that, since mid-June, more than 75% of Kosovo’s Serbs have left the province. Similarly, of the 40,000 to 50,000 Roma, a substantial but unknown number have departed. There are no precise figures as to the remaining minority population. In early September 1999, the number of Serbs still in Kosovo was estimated at around 97,000.

But departures continue, as both the security situation and conditions of access to humanitarian assistance and services become more and more difficult. In early September 1999, OSCE and UNHCR reported an "alarming deterioration in the situation for many minority communities." Serbs continue to be the primary target of violent attacks, including killings, beatings and forced evictions, which are often followed by the looting and torching of houses. In addition, threats and intimidation against Serbs continue to be reported almost daily by UNHCR and KFOR. In an atmosphere of increasing tensions and hardening attitudes between ethnic Albanians and Serbs, more and more ethnically mixed villages and towns are disappearing, as Serbs move into enclaves, often under KFOR protection. Throughout Kosovo, many Serbs or other minorities—including Albanians in the Serb-dominated northern part of Mitrovica—are confined to their apartments 24 hours a day or cannot leave their enclaves without KFOR escorts. They have extremely limited access to markets, health or other services and depend entirely on direct assistance delivered to them by UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations.

The past two months have also seen a rapid rise in organized criminal activity exploiting the security vacuum. Increasingly, Kosovar Albanians are affected by violence and crime, particularly forced evictions. Much of the organized crime is said to be linked with former KLA members and their supporters. The capacity of KFOR and UNMIK Police to respond to breaches of law and order is limited to the most serious crimes, and in many cases those arrested are released after a few days by the newly appointed courts. Often, this is thought to be due to pressures from persons associated with the KLA.

The result is a climate of increasing lawlessness, violence and insecurity. Institutions capable of effectively curbing crime and implementing law and order in Kosovo are urgently needed. Yet, four months into its mission, UNMIK has not been able to establish a rule of law. On the contrary, even its efforts to provide legal certainty by defining the legal framework for Kosovo have been delayed by disputes over the very basis of the applicable law. Fifty-seven judges and prosecutors have been appointed and criminal courts have begun to work at the district and appeals level, but their functioning is severely hampered by resource constraints. Moreover, it has quickly become apparent that the judiciary is subject to enormous pressures and interference that raise grave concerns as to the capacity of the system for effective, independent and impartial justice.

There is an unusually high rate of decisions by the new judiciary to release those suspected of crimes, ethnically or otherwise motivated, since the arrival of KFOR. Many of these suspects are widely considered to be dangerous and a threat to the community. This undermines popular confidence in the ability of both the policing and justice system to ensure public safety and order; it fails to provide an effective deterrent against crime; and it makes future trials very unlikely. There are also serious doubts whether, in this highly politicized and increasingly tense situation, the fundamental right to a fair trial can be ensured in cases involving charges of genocide and war crimes. Yet these trials are an acid test of the fairness of the new justice system, and the way in which the trials are conducted is likely to have an important effect on future relations between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo.

All of UNMIK’s efforts to establish and cement respect for the rule of law are seriously hampered by what can only be described as a scandalous lack of resources and, to some extent, planning. The UN is short of legal staff as well as skilled translators urgently needed for the legislative reform process. The working of the courts is affected in various ways ranging from the lack of even the most basic office supplies and equipment to a dire shortage of qualified translators. More disturbing still is the continued failure to pay salaries for judges and other judicial personnel—a budget for these vital positions is only being established now, four months into the mission, and proposed salaries for legal professionals are entirely inadequate.

II. The Legislative Framework

Under Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), the international civilian administration in Kosovo was entrusted with a sweeping mandate(11): all legislative and executive powers, including the administration of justice, vest in UNMIK and will continue to do so until elections are held(12) . Yet the terms of Resolution 1244 (1999) do not address the issue of applicable law, leaving this task to the SRSG instead, and there is confusion regarding how the SRSG should proceed. The result is uncertainty about which law should be applied. It is unclear whether or not decisions made by the newly appointed judicial authorities (for example, decisions to release or to continue detention, charges and indictments) are valid, or void for not being based on an existing law or for being incompatible with the mandate, aims and purposes of UNMIK. Human Rights First is particularly concerned about this problem because the process of clarifying these issues may take several more months to be completed, leaving existing cases in limbo.

The confusion causes by disputes over the applicable law also appears to have overshadowed key elements of legal reform. Human Rights First is concerned that UNMIK has not done enough to assure that law reform proceeds quickly, takes into account international human rights principles and, once complete, is disseminated immediately.

A. The Legal Framework: What Law Applies ?

Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) empowers the SRSG to "change, repeal or suspend existing laws to the extent necessary for the carrying out of his functions, or where existing laws are incompatible with the mandate, aims and purposes of the interim civil administration," (13) and to "issue legislative acts in the form of regulations", to remain in force until repealed by the SRSG or suspended by rules issued by theKosovo Transitional Authority once it is established.(14)

Under this mandate, the SRSG issued Regulation No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, which stipulates(15):

"The laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 2025 shall continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not conflict with the standards referred to in section 2(16), the fulfillment of the mandate given to UNMIK under UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), or the present or any other regulation issued by UNMIK."

UNMIK’s understanding was that the law to be applied consisted of those provisions of FRY and Serbian laws in force on March 23, 1999, insofar as they were consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards.

However, this interpretation of Section 3, Regulation No. 1999/1 is contested by a number of Kosovar judges, prosecutors and lawyers who refuse to apply the Serbian Criminal Code, which they see as discriminatory because of the manner in which it was applied by the previous Serb authorities. They argue that the law applicable in Kosovo prior to March 24, 2025 also included the Kosovo Criminal Code, which had been in force until 1989, when it was revoked by the Serbian Parliament—an act considered to have been in breach of the FRY Constitution and therefore illegitimate. There has been less controversy with regard to the FRY Criminal Code and, in particular, the FRY Code of Criminal Procedure, which had applied to all parts of the former Yugoslavia prior to its breakup in 1991, since it had been passed in 1977 with the participation of representatives of Kosovo. It should be noted that, while the FRY Criminal Code contains provisions covering war crimes or crimes against humanity, the Kosovo Criminal Code does not.

B. Legislative Reform Process

On August 15, 2024 the SRSG convened a meeting of some 50 local legal experts and representatives of international agencies. It was decided to establish a Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Matters (hereinafter JAC), which should advise UNMIK on identifying areas for legal reform, including discriminatory laws that should be suspended immediately, and focus on enacting legislation in cooperation with international experts, as identified by UNMIK. At its first meeting on August 18, 1999, the JAC, which consists of 20 Kosovar and seven international members, elected a seven-member Executive Board and established working groups in the areas of criminal law, civil law, property law, economic law and administrative law (17). These working groups have begun drafting proposals for texts to be promulgated as interim legislation by the SRSG.

The JAC’s working group on criminal law is currently preparing drafts for a Code of Criminal Procedure and a Criminal Code, to be presented to the SRSG following the JAC’s plenary meeting on October 5, 2024 (18). By way of models, the working group is using the relevant laws of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Albania, as well as the comments and suggestions made by four experts of the Council of Europe (19). At the request of UNMIK, these experts had reviewed the FRY Code of Criminal Procedure and Criminal Code, the Serbian Criminal Code, the Law on internal affairs and the Law on public peace and order. Their draft reports were submitted to the SRSG on September 9, 1999. Following a meeting in Strasbourg on September 13, 1999, the four experts recommended that priority attention be given to a number of provisions of the FRY Code of Criminal Procedure, which should either be suspended or amended, as they were considered to be clearly incompatible with internationally recognized human rights standards. In particular, these include provisions concerning deprivation of liberty, access to defense counsel and freedom of correspondence.(20)

As the next step in the process of criminal law reform, UNMIK will need to translate the drafts presented by the JAC from Albanian into English and Serbian. It is envisaged that they will then be submitted to the Council of Europe as well as the UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) in New York and other international experts for a review of their compatibility with international standards. Once the process is completed, it is for the SRSG to enact the new, interim legislation by promulgating a Regulation.

3. Challenges

1. Applicable law

In Regulation No. 1999/1, the SRSG has defined the law to be applied, but, as noted above, the basis for the definition has been disputed. A number of observers have expressed concern at UNMIK’s reluctance to clarify the meaning of Regulation No. 1999/1 and determine what law should be applied in Kosovo until the promulgation of a Regulation enacting new legislation (21). In the absence of an authoritative interpretation of Section 3, judges and prosecutors in the newly established courts in Kosovo currently apply either Kosovo or Serbian criminal law, as they see fit.(22)

The practical effect of this uncertainty has not yet been fully realized. Suspects currently detained by KFOR and UNMIK Police may have been arrested under one set of principles and had another applied during a detention hearing. The likelihood that some procedural error has occurred in these cases is high. It remains unclear how many will file appeals based upon the confusion in the applicable law. Until new laws are promulgated, these problems cannot be resolved.

2. Resources

One factor that is likely to hamper the swift implementation of the legislative reform process is the lack of resources for adequate translation services. Legal experts must work simultaneously with texts in three languages: Albanian, Serbian and English. The translation of draft legislation requires both language skills and specialist knowledge, neither of which is currently available to UNMIK, which lacks the financial resources to hire qualified translators (23). Similarly, the JAC has not been funded; UNMIK has not been in a position to provide the JAC with material support, for example, a computer, office space, secretarial assistance or an honorarium for the members of its working groups involved in preparing drafts of laws (24).

3. Dissemination

Uncertainty as to the applicable law is reinforced by the fact that, until now, there is no system in place for the publication and dissemination of legal acts, including the SRSG’s own regulations; UNMIK has not issued an official organ, or gazette. Thus far, regulations have been made public only via press releases and UNMIK News leaflets. They have not been made available to judicial officials or to the public at large in a systematic manner.(25)

4. International legal framework

The legislative reform efforts in Kosovo are being carried out with reference to internationally recognized standards of human rights. The main instrument referred to in this process is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This is usually explained by the regional context and the need for integration into the wider European human rights framework, including European standards for the protection of minorities. There is no doubt that this approach will strengthen the protection of human rights for all inhabitants of Kosovo (26). However, other applicable international human rights instruments, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) should be treated as parallel and equal sets of norms, and the UN should see itself as having a special duty to promote these international standards (27). The principle of continuity of international obligations requires that all international treaty commitments of FRY be reflected in the current legislative process (28). This is a principle that should be of general application, not only in Kosovo, but also for future UN missions, which may not take place in a context that allows the application of the ECHR.

D. Recommendations

• The legal vacuum in Kosovo has yet to be filled. UNMIK has sought continuity of laws, but the choice and content of the laws to be continued has been disputed. UNMIK should urgently make it clear which criminal laws are to be applied pending the promulgation of new legislation for Kosovo. This will involve clarifying the meaning of Section 3, Regulation No. 1999/1, and determining, in particular, which of the two competing criminal laws is to be applied. If necessary, UNMIK could rename these laws and call them the "interim laws of Kosovo."

• In the interests of establishing certainty with regard to the criminal laws applicable in Kosovo, the current legislative reform process should be completed as quickly as possible. As a matter of urgence, UNMIK should be provided with the necessary resources and expertise, particularly for competent translation services as well as any technical equipment needed. The US and other governments should support this process by providing funds through the UN budget and/or sending competent translators to UNMIK.

• UNMIK should issue without delay an official gazette for the dissemination of regulations and other official acts of the SRSG. UNMIK should ensure that the gazette is widely distributed throughout Kosovo in Albanian and Serbian.

• While pursuing its efforts to bring legislation into line with European human rights standards, UNMIK should also pay due regard to international human rights instruments applicable to Kosovo. UNMIK sponsorship of these instruments should be clear. In particular, in submitting the draft criminal laws after their translation to international experts for review, at least one of these experts should have the specifically assigned task of assessing these drafts with a view to their compatibility with the provisions of international human rights law and non-treaty standards in the area of human rights.(29)

The fair and effective functioning of the judiciary, and respect for its role within a democratic society, are cornerstones for a viable future Kosovo based on the rule of law. As a consequence, laying the groundwork for an independent and impartial justice system is an essential task for UNMIK—and one of its most pressing challenges. The persistent lack of effective judicial institutions (30) is a key factor in perpetuating a climate of insecurity in Kosovo. The impact is severe: in the absence of any effective deterrent, the level of crime and violence continues to be high. This applies to ethnically motivated crime against minorities, including murders, abductions, beatings, looting, arson, forced evictions, threats and intimidation, and increasingly also to organized criminal activities which impact on the security situation of all inhabitants of Kosovo. Moreover, enabling the domestic justice system to administer justice with regard to the crimes committed in Kosovo under the previous regime, most notably war crimes and crimes against humanity after March 1998, is of utmost importance for the future of Kosovo. If justice is seen to be done in such cases, tensions between Kosovar Albanians and others, particularly Serbs, may decrease, improving the conditions for dialogue, and, eventually, for peaceful co-existence in Kosovo. If justice is not seen to be done, this will inevitably increase the tension between the Albanian and Serb communities.

In the three months since a new justice system was established, constraints, pressures and interference have already become apparent, raising serious doubts about its capacity to administer justice in a manner compatible with international human rights standards. Lack of resources, both human and material, as well as pressures and interference, including threats and intimidation, make for conditions in which the independence and impartiality of judges and prosecutors are in jeopardy. This affects prosecutions for war crimes as well as crimes committed since the arrival of KFOR and UNMIK in June 1999. Because the current system is the seed from which the future justice system will grow, it is essential that UNMIK be seen to respond to these abuses effectively as the steward of a viable future Kosovo.

1. Institutional Aspects

1. UNMIK: Who is Responsible?

Under the overall framework of UNMIK, responsibility for rebuilding the justice system is shared between two of its components: the Civil Affairs component, which is headed by the UN, and the OSCE-led Institution Building component (31). As part of the former, the UN has created a Judicial Affairs Office that deals with the court system, the prosecution service and the correctional system in Kosovo (32). Within the Institution Building pillar, OSCE’s Rule of Law Division, which is part of the Rule of Law and Human Rights section, is tasked with developing mechanisms to ensure that the police, courts, administrative structures and other judicial structures are operating in accordance with international standards of criminal justice and human rights(33). It is further divided into (1) a Judicial Support Unit, which provides logistical and technical assistance to the newly established courts, including facilities for the mobile courts; (2) a Training Unit responsible for setting up a Judicial Training Institute for judges, prosecutors and lawyers; and (3) a Legal Monitoring Unit to assess the functioning of the newly-established justice system (34). OSCE also assists the UN within the Civil Affairs component, most notably by collecting and reviewing applications for all positions within the justice system. (35)

This institutional setup is complex and, to many, confusing. Numerous persons interviewed by Human Rights First during the mission expressed their frustration at what they perceive as gaps between the various agencies involved, and the difficulty of pinning down who is responsible when problems and questions arise.

One major issue of concern continues to be the slow pace with which UNMIK is establishing its presence in matters related to civilian administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary. At the time of Human Rights First’s visit, more than three months after the mission was set up, only four of the six staff within the Judicial Affairs Office were in place (36), and their exact terms of reference were still in the process of being defined. Some of the staff had arrived very recently, replacing others who had already completed their term of mission (37). In the words of one senior official, the deployment of UN civil administration staff "isn’t anywhere near what is needed.(38)" Financial constraints add to the difficulties, as UNMIK lacks adequate funding for the mechanisms and institutions it is establishing, including the justice system.

1. The Newly Appointed Judicial Authorities

a. Judges, Prosecutors and Courts

The authority to appoint judges, prosecutors and other officials lies with the SRSG. An Advisory Judicial Commission has been created that will advise the SRSG on matters related to the appointment of judges and prosecutors, as required, as well as on complaints against any judge or prosecutor (39). The Advisory Judicial Commission replaces the Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointments (40). Another body, the Technical Advisory Commission on the Judiciary and Prosecution Service (41), is to assess the present and long-term requirements for judicial bodies as well as the prosecution service in Kosovo(42). It will consider questions of strategy and planning, such as the number of judges and prosecutors to be appointed as well as the number, level and categories of courts to be established. The members of both commissions have yet to be named.

To date, 50 judges, investigating judges and prosecutors have been appointed by the SRSG at the District and Municipal Courts level, each for a renewable term of three months. The first court to be established, with the appointment on June 30, 1999 of three judges, two investigating judges and four prosecutors, was the Pristina District Court (43). An additional eight judges (44) were assigned to it on July 24, 1999. On the same day, three civil law judges were appointed to the Pristina Municipal Court. District Courts have also been established in Prizren (45), Mitrovica (46) and Pec (47). Thus, four out of the five previously existing District Courts have started functioning again. The jurisdiction of the remaining court, Gnjilane, is being covered, for the time being, by mobile units of the Pristina District Court.

An Ad Hoc Court of Final Appeal, with the powers of the former Kosovo Supreme Court as regards appeals against decisions of District Courts in criminal matters as well as detention terms, and an Ad Hoc Office of the Public Prosecutor were established on September 4, 1999. On September 14, 2024 (48), the SRSG appointed five judges and two prosecutors to these bodies, bringing the total of judges and prosecutors to 57.

b. A "Multi-ethnic" Judiciary ?

One of the stated aims of UNMIK is to set up an independent, impartial and "multi-ethnic" judiciary in Kosovo. Thus far, the SRSG has appointed 44 Kosovar Albanians, seven Serbs, three Muslims, one Turk, one Roma and one Albanian Catholic (49). But finding minority candidates, particularly Serbs, for judicial positions is not an easy task. Many Serb lawyers have departed and there are few left who are prepared to assume functions within the justice system, often out of fear for their safety.

During the first three months since the Pristina District Court started operating, two of its four Serb judges left for Serbia and may not return, while a third one was reported to have been attacked and injured in front of his house. There are no Serb judges or prosecutors at the District Courts in Prizren and Pec. In Pec, one position was reserved for a Serb judge, but thus far it has not been filled. At the Mitrovica District Court, Serb and Albanian judges are said to work together fairly well, but a Serb prosecutor resigned after one day in office. Those Serb judges and prosecutors who remain need KFOR transportation and protection just to attend work. Reportedly, UNMIK also faces difficulties in finding Serbs willing to be appointed as lay judges.(50)

c. Selection Criteria and Training

All of the current judges had worked as judges before 1989; some of the newly appointed prosecutors have previous experience as investigating judges rather than as prosecutors (51). Their initial term of office was three months, with the possibility of renewal. As soon as it starts to operate, the Advisory Judicial Commission will make recommendations for the long-term appointment of judges and prosecutors. UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/7, Section 6, contains a number of criteria for the selection of candidates. Applicants for service as judges and prosecutors must have, inter alia, a university degree in law; have passed the examination for candidates for the judiciary; be of high moral integrity; and have no criminal record nor past participation in discriminatory measures or the application of repressive laws. They should also have relevant work experience in the field of law.(52)

Several observers have expressed concern that the pool of suitable candidates for positions within the judiciary may be limited, and qualified personnel may be more difficult to find as further courts are established and more posts will need to be filled. To some extent, this may be addressed through the provision of training. Following initial two-day sessions which focus on questions such as applicable law and international standards, the role and mandate of ICTY and judicial ethics, OSCE is planning to provide training for judges and prosecutors on a more permanent basis through a Judicial Training Institute. The curriculum for the training is currently being developed, and it has been suggested that it should also contain practical, case-oriented information.

d. Recommendations

• The UN should expedite the deployment of staff. Governments should make the necessary resources available as a matter of urgency.

• The multi-ethnic composition of the judiciary is an important element in promoting fairness. Therefore, Human Rights First urges UNMIK and KFOR to continue to provide protection and ensure conditions favorable to the participation of minorities in the justice system.

• UNMIK should be supported in its efforts to train and appoint judges, prosecutors and other necessary personnel. Human Rights First urges all governments to make the necessary resources available toward this end. Training for judges and prosecutors should be mandatory, case-specific and practical. Governments should provide the necessary resources, including experienced trainers.

• UNMIK should streamline and clarify responsibilities within its own structure, so as to facilitate cooperation and coordination.

B. The Functioning of the Justice System—Fair Trial Issues

Since late June 1999, the newly established District Courts have, for the most part, conducted reviews of the legality of arrests carried out by KFOR—and recently also by UNMIK Police—and made decisions on the continuation of pre-trial detention, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the FRY Code of Criminal Procedure (54). Most of these cases concerned crimes committed since the arrival of KFOR in mid-June, but there are also cases of suspected involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity under the previous regime. The Ad Hoc Court of Final Appeal has so far dealt with a small number of cases in which the term of pre-trial detention had reached the 90-day deadline for review set forth in Article 197 (2) of the FRY Code of Criminal Procedure.

This initial phase has already given rise to serious concerns about the capacity of the new justice system for effective, independent and fair justice. The functioning of the courts is hampered by both a dire shortage of financial and human resources and political pressures and interference, including threats and intimidation, that make it very difficult for judges and prosecutors to preserve their independence and impartiality. This affects all types of criminal proceedings in Kosovo. However, given their legal complexity and the political sensitivities surrounding them, prosecutions for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity provide a particularly stark example of the need to protect the judiciary from pressures and political influences.(55)

1. Fair Trial Concerns in War Crimes Proceedings

Thus far, the number of people arrested on charges of war crimes is relatively small. At the time of Human Rights First’s visit to Kosovo, there were seven cases before the Prizren District Court (56). The District Court in Mitrovica was conducting investigations in at least four such cases, while a mobile court had ordered the detention of another person suspected of war crimes in Lipljan.

However, this is only the beginning. As grave sites continue to be discovered, and a variety of investigative efforts collect witness statements and other evidence, huge amounts of information are likely to be produced, as the need for accountability for past crimes is enormous (57). Yet the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), has already issued a clear statement to the effect that the ICTY will investigate and prosecute only a very limited number of criminal acts committed in Kosovo. Given that the ICTY’s prosecution strategy "…properly focuses on leadership investigative targets, as well as perpetrators of particularly serious crimes or sexual violence in relation to the armed conflict…", and in view of the need to "make a realistic appraisal of the resources that she has available to her to carry out her mandate under the ICTY Statute,(58)" the Prosecutor made it clear that "…ICTY has neither the mandate, nor the resources, to function as the primary investigative and prosecutorial agency for all criminal acts committed on the territory of Kosovo.(59)" The vast majority of war crimes proceedings will therefore have to take place in the domestic courts.

In most cases, the defendants in war crimes trials will be Serbs. There is widespread concern that in the tense and highly politicized situation currently prevailing in Kosovo, and in view of the resulting pressures and potential conflicts of interest, they will not have a fair trial.

Concern about the quality of the proceedings begins at the preliminary stage, where the prosecutor and the investigating judge, under the inquisitorial system in place, have a duty to examine all evidence, including elements in favor of the suspect, and continues at all levels of the procedure. It also encompasses the question of adequate defense: Human Rights First was told that, in some of the war crimes cases in Prizren, the suspects may not have been fully informed of their right to be represented by a defense counsel of their choice rather than having one assigned to them. It was also reported that, in at least one case, the first contact between the defendant and his lawyer took place only a few minutes before the detention hearing (60). Depending on the circumstances and location, witnesses giving testimony in war crimes proceedings may also be at risk (61).

a. Pressures and Interference with the Working of the Judiciary

It is becoming increasingly apparent that judges, prosecutors and lawyers are subjected to enormous pressure. As noted earlier, the numbers of active Serb judges and prosecutors are dwindling. Those Serb judges who remain in Kosovo need transport and protection from KFOR to be able to go to work in safety. But security threats are not confined to Serbs: it was reported that Kosovar Albanian judges, too, have requested protection measures from KFOR, including steel doors and fortified locks. In at least one case, the beating of a relative of a judge was said to have been directly related to the latter’s profession. Tensions between Kosovar Albanians and other groups, particularly Serbs, which have been high since the end of the NATO bombardment, have intensified and appear to have become more entrenched over the past two months. This is particularly true in Mitrovica, currently a flashpoint of ethnically motivated violent incidents, and also in Prizren, where the few Serbs who remain live under constant threat, confined to their houses or a church seminary in the center of town (62).

b. Allegations of Improper Individual Conduct

There are also reports that raise questions as to the impartiality of some individual judges. Human Rights First was told that one judge had openly expressed his opinion that all Serb judges and court officials should be put on trial for war crimes (63). Similar comments were said to have been made by another judge in open court (64). Others reportedly walked out of a room because a Serb was present (65). Another judge was said to have recommended to UNMIK police that they should beat a detainee until the desired information could be obtained (66).

None of the cases reviewed by the new courts in Kosovo has reached the trial stage (67), and one should be careful not to pre-judge the professionalism and integrity of the judges and prosecutors involved. Nor should the conduct of certain individuals be seen as representative of all judges in Kosovo. However, it is essential, particularly in cases as complex and potentially politicized as these, that war crimes trials not only satisfy the requirements of fairness as prescribed in relevant international human rights standards, but also that justice be seen to be done. In the present circumstances in Kosovo, war crimes trials before the District Courts are not likely to meet either criterion.

c. Recommendations

There is a clear need for war crimes proceedings to be held, both to ensure accountability for past abuses and to strengthen efforts at confidence-building and dialogue for the future. If justice is done, and is seen to be done, it would help diffuse the assumption of the collective guilt of all Serbs, currently held by many ethnic Albanians and the cause, in part, of the continued violence directed against Serbs, regardless of their individual criminal responsibility.

Pressures and irregularities are likely to be greatest in the highly politicized context of war crimes trials. The capacity to ensure fair trials under such circumstances will be an acid test for the new judiciary in Kosovo. There are various options to enhance the likelihood of fair trials. Most of them are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, Human Rights First believes that they are necessary and complementary. Human Rights First recommends:

• Change of venue: holding war crimes proceedings in Pristina instead of, for example, Prizren or Mitrovica, should diminish the risk of undue pressure on the court as well as the likelihood that judges and prosecutors will know the defendants or victims and have pre-conceived views on the cases in question. However, given that Kosovo is fairly small and war crimes have occurred throughout its territory, a change of venue will not in itself be sufficient to ensure fair trials in all cases.

• Strengthening of the defense: defendants must be aware of their rights. Their right to an adequate defense must be fully respected. This applies, in particular, to the right of defendants to be represented by counsel of their choice. In the current situation in Kosovo, compliance with international standards pertaining to an adequate defense may require participation of defense lawyers from other civil law countries. UNMIK should lift any formal obstacles to the participation of qualified international defense lawyers in such cases. KFOR and UNMIK Police should provide physical protection for defense lawyers, as required.

• A separate chamber for war crimes and other serious crimes: the complex legal issues and substantial resources required for the conduct of war crimes prosecutions pose a challenge to any legal system. Given the resource constraints and extraordinary political pressure facing the newly-established courts in Kosovo, Human Rights First is of the view that a separate chamber should be set up within Pristina District Court to handle those war crimes cases that are not taken up by the ICTY and other serious crimes. Human Rights First believes that this separate chamber should be composed of Kosovar as well as international judges, and should have its own, similarly composed appeal chamber. Kosovars respected and renowned for their fairness and impartiality should be appointed as prosecutors, judges and lay judges for the special chamber. The presence of international prosecutors and judges would serve as a guarantor of impartiality and independence, without, however, precluding Kosovars from participating in bringing to justice those responsible for war crimes (68). KFOR and UNMIK Police should provide protection, as required. The international community should provide the necessary funding.

As noted before, the ICTY will be able to prosecute only in a small number of war crimes cases in Kosovo. However, taking into account the serious limitations of the domestic justice system, Human Rights First believes that the ICTY’s role should go beyond mutual information-sharing on an ad hoc basis. Instead, a more formal process of oversight of intended domestic prosecutions for war crimes is warranted.

• Review of war crimes prosecutions by the ICTY: a review process along the lines of the "Rules of the Road" agreement for Bosnia-Hercegovina should be put into place in Kosovo. Under this procedure, which was agreed upon in February 1996 by the Presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and FRY, no domestic investigation or prosecution for war crimes could be commenced or proceeded with unless the ICTY had reviewed the case file and verified that the evidence gathered was adequate to support the charges and complied with international standards. Under the "Rules of the Road" procedure, files were sent to The Hague for review. For Kosovo, the ICTY office in Pristina should be supplied with sufficient staff and secure funding to carry out such reviews. In each case, the ICTY should make a statement within 90 days on whether or not the evidence available is sufficient for proceedings to go forward.

Other measures, such as the presence of international judges and prosecutors as special advisors in the District Courts, or the establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism, would strengthen procedural fairness in all judicial proceedings and are dealt with in Section II.5.

2. Fair Trial Concerns in other Types of Criminal Proceedings

As noted before, concern with regard to procedural fairness is not limited to cases related to abuses committed under the previous regime. The handling of cases involving crimes committed since the arrival of KFOR in June 1999, by the newly established judicial authorities, also raises questions with regard to their independence and impartiality and suggests that prosecutors and judges may face outside pressure to stop investigations or drop charges. It is feared that, once such cases reach trial stage, there will be additional interference seeking the acquittal of persons accused of crimes.

a. Detention reviews: release decisions

The most conspicuous development in this regard is the unusually high rate of releases from detention of persons arrested by KFOR, and recently also UNMIK Police. KFOR continues to be responsible for ensuring public order and safety in most parts of Kosovo, according to its mandate under Resolution 1244 (1999). Since June 18, 1999, when it arrested its first suspect on murder charges, KFOR has made arrests on a daily basis. At any given point in time, approximately 250 persons are being held in detention at the different multinational brigades in various parts of Kosovo (69). Given its manpower constraints and limited detention facilities, KFOR concentrates primarily on cases involving the most serious offenses, such as murder, attempted murder, serious assault and rape (70). These cases are considered to be only the "tip of the iceberg" of criminal activity in Kosovo. Those arrested are either caught red-handed or apprehended as a result of investigations by KFOR or UNMIK Police.

Despite this focus on serious offenses, the newly appointed judicial authorities have so far ordered the release of approximately 40% of those arrested after reviewing their cases (71). Observers consider this proportion to be unusually high, and there is great concern that many of those released are dangerous criminals who constitute a threat to the community. In some cases where release is ordered, criminal investigations are said to continue, but given the severe resource constraints facing the courts, it is uncertain what investigations will be completed. (72)

In many cases, reports or written statements are submitted to the judges conducting detention reviews by KFOR or UNMIK Police, whose officers have witnessed incidents and, in some cases, had been under attack themselves. However, the investigating judges frequently disregard such statements, because they are not translated into Albanian. KFOR lacks the capacity to have all documents translated. In some cases, written documents are reportedly translated orally during the hearing, but the level of proficiency of court translators is often said to be insufficient. In other cases, where it was felt that facts of the case were being lost due to unsatisfactory translation, KFOR has provided its own translators. Another problem is that investigating judges generally do not accept written statements by witnesses who have left Kosovo and are no longer available for oral examination.(75)

These shortcomings have led to frustration, and in a number of recent cases where the judges decided to release persons, KFOR decided to ignore the order and keep them in detention. The FRY Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for an appeal in cases where both the prosecutor and the investigating judge agree on the release. Nevertheless, in one instance (76), the panel of three judges, which would under normal circumstances hear appeals by the prosecutor or the detainee against decisions of the investigating judge, decided to review the case and decided that the person in question should remain in detention.

There is great concern among KFOR and others in Kosovo that the high release rate seriously undermines efforts to restore public order and safety in the province. As noted by more than one official during Human Rights First’s visit, the current working of the judiciary does not deter crime, and may even have the reverse effect.

b. Pressure and interference

There are strong indications that decisions to release suspects are often the result of interference with the judiciary. This may take the form of political interference, through pressure and intimidation, instances of which have been described above. In addition, the lack of adequate and regular payment for judges, prosecutors and others working in the justice system also greatly enhances the danger of corruption. (78)

One source of political interference in the working of the newly appointed justice system is persons affiliated with the KLA. Formally, the KLA no longer exists. It was demilitarized and officially disbanded on September 20, 1999. However, those linked with it in the past are still referred to as KLA members or supporters. Thus, Human Rights First was told of incidents in which KLA supporters had intervened and obtained the release of detainees. In one case, five persons were said to have been released for lack of evidence a few minutes after a KLA member was seen talking to the investigating judge, and despite the fact that KFOR had submitted reports, including signed statements by KFOR soldiers who had been present during the arrests. In another case, the KLA reportedly obtained the release of a Kosovar Albanian arrested on charges of war crimes. Various observers remarked that those with links to the KLA are generally not kept in detention for very long, if at all.

In Prizren, the KLA is said to operate its own "parallel justice system": a self-styled "prosecutor" calls people considered to be "collaborators" for "informative talks," during which they are reportedly threatened and intimidated. Targets include anyone seen as having had ties with the former regime, including, for example, Kosovar Albanians who had kept their jobs during the past 10 years. UNMIK has not been able to stop this practice. In every region, there are credible and systematic reports of young men dressed in black, detaining, questioning and in some cases threatening and beating people, including Kosovar Albanians.

Given the general sense among those met by Human Rights First during its visit that the KLA is "stronger now than it was before (79)," these expressions of lack of respect for the rule of law and the working of the judiciary are very disturbing. Though there are some indications that the KLA’s heavy-handed tactics have begun to erode its political support among the population, reports of the KLA’s continued involvement with criminal activity, including organized crime, remain a matter of serious concern.(80)

c. Non-payment of Salaries

The failure to pay salaries for judges and prosecutors also risks compromising their capacity to remain independent and impartial, both in war crimes and other criminal proceedings. Though many judges have been working for over three months, they have received only a one-time stipend of DM500 (US$285) from the UN (81). Some of the judges, as well as their staff, have worked without a salary to date. It was explained to Human Rights First that the UN has a budget to cover the costs of its own mission, but not for the financing of any of the mechanisms established under UNMIK’s mandate. Indeed, at the time of Human Rights First’s visit the process of establishing a budget for the justice system was still under way.(82)

On October 1, 1999, UNMIK announced that a second round of stipend payments to civil servants and public sector employees in Kosovo was to take place between October 1 and 11. Judges and prosecutors were to receive DM300 (US$170) on a monthly basis until the end of December 1999 (83). Stipends are being paid out of contributions from donor countries to a Trust Fund. After that, the payment of regular salaries should begin (84). While the level of the salaries had not yet been established at the time of Human Rights First’s visit, there is concern that the salary levels eventually set by UNMIK will not be sufficient to provide the modicum of professional recognition necessary to preserve judges’ dignity and prevent risks of corruption (85). As one judge put it, "we have high ethical standards, but we have to feed our families."(86)

d. Lack of Resources

The proper functioning of the judiciary is also seriously hampered by the lack of basic resources, such as office supplies. The District Court in Mitrovica, for example, does not have telephones, paper, pencils, files, photocopiers or typewriters, let alone computers. At the Pristina District Court, there are typewriters but apparently no spare parts, and there is no petty cash to purchase such supplies. The courts’ capacity to conduct proper investigations is also limited by lack of vehicles—prosecutors and judges rely on OSCE and, in some areas, KFOR, for transport. The shortage of qualified translators and interpreters makes work difficult in many cases.

e. Recommendations

Setting up a justice system is one of the most pressing tasks for UNMIK at the present time. If the newly established courts are to be the stepping stone toward a fair and independent justice system capable of safeguarding the rule of law for all inhabitants of Kosovo, steps must be taken from the very beginning to enable them to function in a manner that is consistent with international human rights standards; irregularities today will haunt all Kosovars tomorrow.

Shortcomings and problems that hamper the courts’ ability to work and threaten to undermine the independence and impartiality of judges and prosecutors have already become apparent. They must be addressed as a matter of utmost urgency.

• The judicary, as a matter of priority, should be provided with the necessary resources. Human Rights First calls on UNMIK to put into place an adequate salary scheme for judges, prosecutors and other staff working in the justice system. The scale of the salaries should reflect the important functions entrusted to the judiciary and the need to enable the courts to work in an independent and impartial manner. UN member states should provide the necessary funds as a matter of urgency.

• UN member states should significantly increase their financial contributions to UNMIK, to cover the costs of administering Kosovo’s new institutions as well as those of the mission. UNMIK should establish the budgets for the mechanisms and institutions created under its mandate without further delay.

UNMIK and the SRSG should be prepared to intervene strenuously to ensure respect for the rule of law.

• Specifically, UNMIK must make clear to all Kosovars—in particular the judiciary and the KLA leadership—that a future Kosovo based on democratic foundations cannot be built if the rule of law is not respected by all. This message should be reinforced by UN member states in their bilateral contacts with political groups in Kosovo.

• UNMIK should counter any attempts to undermine the proper functioning of the justice system, either through threats and intimidation or corruption. Judges and prosecutors should be encouraged to report any attempts to undermine their integrity or threats to their safety, and KFOR and UNMIK Police should provide effective protection, as required. The SRSG should make it clear that any such instance will be investigated and those responsible prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

Generally, UNMIK should make every effort to ensure conditions in which the fundamental guarantees of fair justice are respected. In view of their particular nature, domestic war crimes proceedings require specific measures (87). Human Rights First also believes that the following actions are urgently needed to strengthen the capacity of the justice system to deal with all matters that come before it.

• Presence of international experts in District Courts: Human Rights First is of the view that, during an interim period, District Courts would benefit from the presence of prosecutors and judges from civil law countries, particularly in Europe. Their role should be that of technical advisors, to provide expertise in judicial affairs in a purely advisory role, thus respecting the independence of the courts. (88)

• Strengthening the defense: The training programs set up for judges and prosecutors should include defense lawyers, and special programs for lawyers should be considered as required. UNMIK should also take steps for a Kosovo Bar Association to be activated as soon as possible. UNMIK should allow the participation of lawyers from other civil law countries in Europe in the most serious cases, particularly war crimes prosecutions. UNMIK should lift any formal obstacles to the participation of qualified international defense lawyers in such cases.

• Public information and education: UNMIK, together with OHCHR, UNICEF and other qualified partners, should develop and implement education programs and public information campaigns focusing on the rule of law and raising awareness about its fundamental importance in ensuring a stable society for all inhabitants of Kosovo. The law faculty and students at the university would be an excellent place to start.

At present, the performance of the new courts is being monitored and assessed by the OSCE’s Legal Monitoring Unit. The latter, however, is part of the Rule of Law Disivion, which also plays an important role in the process of identifying and selecting judges and prosecutors. Human Rights First shares the concern expressed by various observers with regard to this perceived, and perhaps real, conflict of interest. Human Rights First believes that there is a need for independent monitoring.

• An entirely independent judicial oversight mechanism should be put into place, either by detaching the Legal Monitoring Unit from the OSCE, or by setting up a different mechanism. The OHCHR would be well placed to provide an independent monitoring and oversight capacity and should be provided with sufficient resources for this task.

• Judicial and prosecutorial misconduct should not be tolerated; judges and prosecutors should be held to the highest standards and if they fail to meet them, should be sanctioned. OSCE, the UN’s Judicial Affairs Unit and others charged with monitoring the justice system must rigorously oversee its performance and not hesitate to make public their findings, especially where these reveal shortcomings and difficulties.

Together with an independent and functioning justice system, effective policing in accordance with international human rights standards is essential if respect for the rule of law is to be ensured. In Kosovo, under Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), KFOR is responsible for ensuring public safety and order until the international civilian administration takes over. But UNMIK also has a mandate for establishing and training a local police force—the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), which will eventually inherit police powers and remain in place beyond the involvement of the international policing presence.

To date, policing efforts have been far from successful. Both KFOR and UNMIK Police have only a limited capacity to respond to breaches of law and order, and the impact of gaps in policing is aggravated by the ineffectiveness of the newly-established courts in prosecuting and convicting those responsible for crimes, thus failing to deter unlawful activities. The resulting vacuum in maintaining law and order has contributed to a climate of unchecked criminality that especially benefits those responsible for organized crime, including KLA supporters. Rising levels of violence and crime paired with virtual impunity make for a progressively deteriorating security situation in Kosovo. This affects the human rights and freedoms not only of minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma, but increasingly also of Kosovar Albanians who lack strong ties to the KLA.

1. International Policing: KFOR and UNMIK Police

With the exception of Pristina, where UNMIK Police took over primary responsibility on September 13, 1999, responsibility for policing in Kosovo still lies with KFOR. Though primarily relying on its experience as a military force, KFOR has utilized military police to help direct its law enforcement operations, thus ensuring at least some level of familiarity with policing. Some KFOR troops have carried out regular foot patrols to interact with communities and established quick-response units to deploy forces in emergency situations. KFOR has also initiated programs to compile reports of criminal activity and to investigate crime scenes. Patrols have also assisted vulnerable minorities with security issues, providing phone lines, strengthening doors and locks, and, in some cases, offering 24-hour protection. KFOR is credited by many in Kosovo with having ensured at least a minimum level of security in many areas, especially in Pristina where British KFOR adopted a particularly robust approach. Other national contingents including U.S. Forces and the Italian Carabinieri have taken a much more passive approach and have been often ineffective in combating crime even though they have more than adequate resources.(89)

But the level of policing provided by KFOR throughout Kosovo remains uneven, with the various national contingents responding in a different manner to breaches of law and order (90). KFOR readily admits that it has been able to focus only on the "tip of the iceberg" of criminal activity in Kosovo, limiting its response largely to the most serious offenses, such as murder, rape and serious assault, thus leaving untouched the majority of crimes, including, in particular, forced evictions, robbery, extortion and other property crimes. Minorities, and especially Serbs, continue to be primary targets of violence and crime, but Kosovar Albanians are increasingly affected by the overall climate of lawlessness.

This is due, in part, to an increase in organized criminal activity in Kosovo. There are reports of mafia-style gangs from outside Kosovo (91), but often organized crime appears to be linked with persons associated with the KLA (92). Thus, for example, Human Rights First was told that KLA-associated members of a so-called "Commission for Investigation on Social and Private Property" have been forcing residents to prove ownership of property, pay a "fine," or face forced eviction (93). It was also reported that gangs linked to the KLA are willing to secure an apartment by eviction for DM1,000 (US$570).(94)

There is widespread concern that as UNMIK Police gradually take over from KFOR, the security situation is likely to worsen. By October 7, 1999, 1,650 of the initially planned 3,100 international civilian police had arrived in Kosovo (95). It has become apparent, however, that even at full deployment, the ratio of police to inhabitants would be well below the norm of that in other countries and that a significant increase is required (97). On September 10, 1999, the SRSG called for an expansion in the force to 6,000. Despite many previous examples where international civilian police were deployed within a UN mission (e.g. in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Cambodia), lessons learned were not applied in Kosovo. Deployment has been slow, and in several cases insufficiently qualified police officers had to be sent home after expense and time was wasted in bringing them to Kosovo.

Thus far, UNMIK Police has assumed responsibility only in the city and region of Pristina. In other areas, UNMIK Police officers have begun working with KFOR, mainly through joint patrols, and are in various stages of transition into control. But even in Pristina, KFOR is still relied upon, particularly for its quick-response unit. UNMIK Police have had difficulty in deploying sufficient force and have not yet implemented a style of policing that emphasizes interaction with the local population, a model British KFOR have used with some success. The police have also shown little capacity to replicate the 24-hour protection KFOR has offered to some particularly threatened minorities. Most observers expect that, at best, the UNMIK Police will only maintain the limited level of security provided by KFOR.

UNMIK officials suggest that the international police force needs more time to complete deployment and work out early problems. However, Human Rights First believes that it is important for UNMIK to acknowledge the gap in policing and to respond to it immediately. In part, this is a question of resources, identifying suitable personnel and overcoming bureaucratic obstacles in deployment.

But there are also structural issues. One problem lies in the relatively short tour of duty—six months—which is likely to hinder an effective policing model, as the resulting high turnover prevents officers from building lasting relationships in the neighborhoods where they are assigned and quickly wastes any field experience that is gained over time.

There is also some reason for concern with the training program for UNMIK Police currently in place. The short and basic program consists of three tests (in English, use of firearms, and driving); a short program of local and cultural information; and the rules of engagement. Though UNMIK Police officers are required to have extensive policing experience in their home countries, the force is drawn from a diverse set of cultures and legal systems. In this context more training may be necessary to ensure the force performs effectively and in full compliance with international human rights standards. During initial training sessions, the human rights component of the training has been inadequate, both in quantity and quality (98). However, efforts to improve the quality of training are already under way, and shortcomings of the first training sessions may be redressed through make-up training, which in turn will provide a possibility to assess continuing training needs.

B. The Kosovo Police Service

Of course, maintaining law and order in Kosovo in the future ultimately depends upon the creation of local police structures and their capacity to provide professional policing in accordance with international human rights standards. UNMIK has begun a process of selecting, recruiting and training Kosovars to serve in the future Kosovo Police Service (KPS). But concern has been raised about the quality of the training program and the risk of political interference.

1. Training of the KPS

Training of the first group of 179 Kosovars selected for service in the KPS began on September 7, 2024 at the OSCE-run police school in Vucitrn. The training program includes an eight-week classroom program that covers all aspects of basic policing skills, to be followed by a 19-week mentoring program during which students are to be paired one-to-one with Field Training Officers (FTOs) drawn from the UNMIK Police. During this period, students will shadow the FTO while participating in police patrols in the field. Trainers hope the mentoring program will allow students to gain practical policing skills while being closely evaluated by the FTOs (99).

Concern has been raised about the quality of both the classroom and field aspects of this program. The classroom training is conducted by international experts with extensive training experience. However, the program has been slow to develop its curriculum in terms of presentation of international policing standards. The human rights training is minimal, and like that of the UNMIK Police, includes dry recitation of international standards without practical application. The UN has produced a booklet that compiles international policing standards into one document; however these materials have not yet been made available to either KPS students or the UNMIK Police (100).

In addition, some of the content of the training has been incorrect or, in at least one case, dangerous. For example, in a section on culture, students were apparently taught that domestic violence is a "part of the culture" in Kosovo and that officers should thus avoid involvement even in violent disputes. During this session, the women in the class complained, and officials have indicated that they will modify the materials. To their credit, training officials have been willing to admit that parts of the classroom training are flawed and have been open to altering them to better reflect international standards.

The field training aspect is also troubling. Since the bulk of the KPS training consists of in-the-field mentoring, the quality of the mentors is the most important element in the success or failure of the model. Since the FTOs are selected from members of the international police, UNMIK Police training and performance are likely to have an influence on the quality of the KPS. Furthermore, the planned additional training for mentors, to supplement their instruction upon joining the UNMIK Police, is minimal, raising the concern that they will not have the skills necessary to train the KPS students in the field. This problem is exacerbated by the short tour of duty of UNMIK Police; since the mentoring program is 19 weeks, it is likely that FTOs will have only had limited experience in Kosovo before assuming a mentoring role.

2. The Kosovo Police Service: Political Pressure

Another area of serious concern involves political pressure on the KPS, pressure that is seen as a threat to the professionalism of the service. One example of such influence is that of the reportedly close association between KLA supporters and the KPS students. As the school was being developed, KLA leaders insisted that all students in the program be approved by them; the opening of the school was delayed by two weeks over these negotiations and by a process of vetting and background checks. The first class was eventually selected from more than 19,500 Kosovars who had applied to join the new service (101), and includes 17 members of minority groups, including 8 Serbs, and 39 women (102). A significant percentage of the class reportedly has KLA ties. In fact, school officials readily admit that KLA influence in the school is pervasive. During Human Rights First’s visit, one official conceded that KLA members were "clearly the informal leadership" of the class, and predicted that one student, a former KLA brigade commander, would be "the next police commissioner for Kosovo.(103)" Others noted the extensive pressure placed on some minorities not to participate in the program.

Officials downplay concern about the KLA influence by noting that it is a "political reality" that KLA supporters will be involved in the new Kosovar institutions and pointing out that the class has interacted well together, including the minority students (104). However, open dominance of KLA supporters in the training program is troubling. Given the close association between KLA and organized criminal activity in Kosovo, KLA dominance of the training program for the new national police could produce officers who face conflicting loyalties once on duty, and the risk of corruption is likely to be high (105). Pressures will be enormous, for example when a KLA-associated police officer is required to make a public arrest of a former KLA members. Allowing quasi-official connections between the KLA and the students will only make this type of situation worse. As the legacy this police school leaves is important, association of its students with KLA members should be met with vigilance (106).

C. The Kosovo Protection Corps

These attempts to politicize the KPS have added to fears about the future role of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Demobilized elements of the KLA will be transformed into this new civilian emergency service agency, established by the SRSG after an agreement was reached between UNMIK, KFOR and the KLA on September 20, 1999. Although the KPC will not be solely comprised of former KLA—it is open, at least theoretically, to others—such fears will likely be reinforced by the recent disclosure that the KPC’s newly appointed commander, Agim Ceku, a former brigadier in the Croatian army, is under investigation by the ICTY in connection with war crimes committed by Croatian soldiers in the Krajina between 1993 and 1995. (108)

The KPC, which will consist of 3,000 members and 2,000 reservists, is to assist UNMIK and KFOR in coping with civilian emergencies, de-mining and the rebuilding infrastructure and communities. Under the agreement of September 20, 1999, out of a total of 2,000 weapons held in trust for the KPC, 200 will be used at any one time for the guarding of installations and security when units are deployed (109). Regulation No. 1999/8 makes it clear that the KPC shall not have any role in law enforcement or the maintenance of law and order (110).

D. Recommendations

Establishing professional and effective policing in any post-war situation is extremely challenging, and the ethnic tensions in Kosovo only make this task more difficult. However, Human Rights First concurs with the view, held by many in Kosovo, that only an immediate increase in policing resources, paired with a vigorous policy of arresting all offenders, will improve stability. Urgent measures are required to strengthen the current policing capacity on the ground.

• The deployment of UNMIK Police officers, including the additional civilian police requested by the SRSG, must be completed as soon as possible. Human Rights First calls on the UN to expedite its efforts to recruit and deploy the necessary personnel. Human Rights First urges governments to speed up the process of identifying and selecting suitable candidates, and to contribute financial resources and equipment, as well as qualified police officers to UNMIK. This includes police officers with skills necessary for specialized units, e.g., on domestic violence, trafficking of women and children, the missing and abducted and, in particular, war crimes investigations. With regard to the latter, governments should contribute forensic experts as well as equipment needed by UNMIK Police in these highly complex investigations.

• It is essential that UNMIK Police reach full capacity as quickly as possible. Professional and effective police training is needed to ensure that the international police force have a clear understanding of their role, the rules of engagement, and international human rights and policing standards. Efforts underway to improve the quality of current training for UNMIK Police by introducing a more thorough human rights component and making the training more practical and case-oriented should be fully supported.

• Until UNMIK Police reaches full capacity to take over responsibility for ensuring public order and safety in Kosovo, the role of KFOR continues to be critical. Governments should increase the resources allocated to KFOR’s policing capacity, including the deployment of additional military police personnel.

• The U.S. and other countries participating in KFOR should review their policy and adopt the more robust approach successfully employed by the British. KFOR should also be pro-active in investigating and reporting crime.

In view of the international community’s responsibility and role in laying the foundation for a future based on respect for the rule of law, Human Rights First believes that it is important for UNMIK to take early steps to redress shortcomings in the process of establishing and training a local Kosovar police force, and to prevent any undue pressure and interference that might prevent the KPS from becoming a professional and non-partisan police force.

• Human Rights First believes that the training of KPS students should reflect international human rights and professional policing standards. It should encourage active learning, including case studies, role-playing and small group exercises.

• Human Rights First suggests that the training schedule for KPS students might be altered in order to maximize the impact of expert-taught classroom experience by organizing the class work and curriculum around the cadets’ field experience. For example, after eight weeks in class, students might enter the field with an FTO for 10 weeks, then return to the classroom to continue their education while reflecting on the practical experience gained during the fieldwork.

• A professional, non-partisan police force is essential to the rule of law. UNMIK should counter any attempt by the KLA or others to politicize the KPS.

• UNMIK and UN member states should require all political parties and groups publicly to undertake to honor and implement basic human rights treaties and norms.

The example of Kosovo also highlights the urgent need for measures to ensure that in similar emergency situations in the future, the international community will be better prepared to provide effective law enforcement and policing capacity from the very beginning.

• Human Rights First again calls on the international community, and in particular, DPKO and OSCE, to work on a standby arrangement, which could be activated in similar situations in the future, whereby qualified personnel can be mobilized quickly to ensure that these fundamental issues of civilian order are part of the emergency first phase response. In cooperation with these agencies, States may pursue the possibility of identifying a pool of suitable staff that may be deployed at short notice, analogous to the practice of some major NGOs who keep rosters of personnel deployable at 24 to 48 hours notice.

• Human Rights First emphasizes the importance of adequate training in international human rights and humanitarian law for those participating in international police forces and calls on OHCHR and OSCE to adopt this as a priority.

• UNMIK should establish a complaints procedure and publicize how people can bring complaints about UNMIK Police and KPS misconduct. UNMIK should also accelerate and prioritize the opening of an ombudsman office to deal with this issue.

• Human Rights First also reiterates its belief that there is an urgent need for a unified peacekeeping code, based on international human rights standards, for international forces who are faced with law enforcement and policing duties in these complex situations and humanitarian crises. There is a need to ensure that peacekeeping troops are trained to respond in a uniform and even-handed manner to violations of human rights law, and in some cases, breaches of international humanitarian law, by all sections of the population.

• The current crisis in Kosovo, and future crises that will inevitably face the UN in the future, make it essential for DPKO, with OHCHR, to elaborate a human rights-based code of conduct to be applied by peace-keeping forces. Human Rights First believes that NATO, with its activities in Kosovo, could also make a valuable contribution in this regard.

In his report to the Security Council of September 16, 1999, the UN Secretary-General warned that "…Kosovo’s future [was] not yet secured (112)," and that the achievements of the past four months would be reversed unless UNMIK is able to address a number of pressing challenges. First among them, the Secretary-General referred to "…the establishment and cementing of the rule of law and the authority of UNMIK…." (113)

The task at hand—clarifying the legal framework and developing the institutions necessary to implement the rule of law—is crucial for UNMIK’s efforts to address immediate human rights protection needs, particularly those of ethnic minorities, and to create conditions conducive to the voluntary return of those who are still abroad as refugees or who are internally displaced in Serbia. Yet at the same time, a functioning, fair and independent justice system is the very basis for peace and stability in a future Kosovo based on the rule of law and respect for international standards, in which all inhabitants, not least the Kosovar Albanians themselves, will be able to enjoy their human rights, dignity and freedoms.

Conversely, failure to make progress in this area will contribute to the long-term instability not only of Kosovo but also of South-Eastern Europe as a whole. The EU Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe offers a process of reconstruction with important emphasis on action in the legal and human rights fields from which Kosovo could greatly benefit. But the benefits will be few if, instead, Kosovo sinks into greater lawlessness where ethnic supremacy and impunity prevail over respect for pluralism, minority rights and the values enshrined in international human rights instruments.

UNMIK’s efforts to lay the foundation for the rule of law must be seen within this wider context. Through its interventions, the international community has assumed the responsibility of securing a sustainable future for all the people of Kosovo. It must now dedicate the political will and material resources required to achieve this task.

1 Available at Human Rights First web site: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org

2 Human Rights First focused specifically on issues related to criminal law and justice. Other important legal issues including property rights, identity and other documents, registration, etc., were not examined during this mission.

3 Human Rights First is grateful to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) Kosovo operation for providing logistical assistance to the mission.

4 Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) of June 10, 2025 authorized the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR, NATO’s troops in Kosovo, were tasked with ensuring security in the province. This includes the mandate to maintain public order and safety until an international civilian police force takes over responsibility for this task.

5 According to UNHCR, Humanitarian Update No.12, September 23, 1999, more than 72,000 Kosovars have returned from non-neighboring countries. This figure includes almost 50,000 whose return has been assisted by the International Organization for Migration. See IOM, Statistical Update No.73, October 8, 1999.

6 See UN DPI, Press Briefing by the SRSG for Kosovo, September 10, 1999. This estimate was based on information collected by KFOR.

7 See UNHCR/OSCE, Second Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, September 6, 1999, para.72.

8 The situation for Roma and other ethnic minorities varies, depending on the circumstances in the particular village or town. For example, Bosniaks or Slavic Muslims in Pec have recently been targeted; three were killed in the first week of October.

9 For details, see UNHCR’s weekly Kosovo Humanitarian Updates and KFOR’s daily Press Briefings.

10 Mitrovica is one of the flashpoints of ethnic tensions at the moment: the river Ibar divides the city into the Serb-controlled northern and the Albanian southern part. Some 8,000 ethnic Albanians and 2,000 Serbs have been displaced from their homes on either side of the river. Attempts by UNMIK to return some Albanians to their home in the north under the auspices of KFOR were met with violent opposition, and resulted in a standoff between armed Serbs and KFOR in which several people were injured on both sides.

11 Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) of June 10, 1999, UNMIK is to provide transitional civil administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions. The body to be elected, once the necessary preconditions for the conduct of elections will be established, has been termed "Kosovo Transitional Authority" by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council of June 12, 1999, UN Document S/1999/779, at para.14.

12 This situation, in which governmental control is exercised by virtue of powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, temporarily replacing host state authority, is not without precedent. A recent example is the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). See Security Council Resolution 1037 (1996), and the Reports by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on UNTAES (UN Documents S/1995/1028, S/1996/472, S/1996/705, S/1997/487, S/1998/59)

13 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of June 12, 1999, UN Document 1999/779, at para. 39.

14 Id., at para. 41.

15 Regulation No. 1999/1 of July 25, 1999, Section 3, entitled "Applicable Law in Kosovo."

16 I.e., "internationally recognized human rights standards" as well as a prohibition of discrimination "against any person on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, association with a national community, property, birth or other status."

17 The Executive Board consists of five Kosovar Albanian and two international experts. It is co-chaired by a Kosovar legal expert and a representative of UNMIK. The Executive Board holds weekly meetings, while the plenary meets once a month. The JAC has a small number of Serb members. They were said to have participated in its first meeting on August 18, 2024 but not in subsequent plenary sessions. Some of them are believed to have left Kosovo and gone to Serbia.

18 Human Rights First was informed that, by early October 1999, working groups of the JAC had already finalized drafts for a law on ID cards, a law on misdemeanors, a law on local governance and administration, a law on pensions, health and social services, and a law concerning property of business premises.

19 This information was provided to Human Rights First by one of the co-chairman of the Executive Board, who is also chairing the JAC’s criminal law working group.

20 Letter from the Council of Europe to the SRSG on September 20, 1999, on file with Human Rights First.

21 For example, it was noted that UNMIK did not issue any official statement clarifying the situation after a local newspaper reported that, at the August 15, 2024 meeting, the SRSG had stated that Serbian law longer applies in Kosovo. It was explained to Human Rights First that this was a misrepresentation of the statement made by the SRSG, who had in fact said at the meeting that those provisions of Yugoslav and Serbian law which did not conform to international standards should not be applied. Likewise, when asked by a judicial official for guidelines on the interpretation of Section 3, and a confirmation that the Serbian Criminal Code should be applied rather than the Kosovo Criminal Code, the SRSG reportedly refused, replying that Regulation No. 1999/1 was clear and any guidelines would have to be issued by the UN in New York.

22 This uncertainty is not without practical consequences. One case was reported to Human Rights First during its mission in which KFOR justified its refusal to comply with the court’s decision to release a suspect on the ground that the court had ordered the release applying the Kosovo Criminal Code, which KFOR considers not to be applicable.

23 The Senior Legal Advisor to the SRSG and his staff are currently assisted by only one translator, who had to be employed using the funds that were originally meant for hiring a secretary.

24 There are, however, plans for the ABA-CEELI to provide support to both UNMIK and the JAC, in particular for the translation of draft legislation.

25 By contrast, the English language Kosovo Times, a Pristina newspaper, reported in late September 1999 that the self-appointed "Government" led by Hashim Thaci had issued an "official gazette."

26 See Human Rights First’s recommendations in its report: Kosovo: Protection and Peace-Building, (New York: 1999), at14-15.

27 According to the Human Rights Committee, once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the ICCPR, such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in government of the State party, including dismemberment into more than one State or State succession or any subsequent action of the State party designed to divest them of the rights guaranteed by the Convenant. See General Comment 26 of December 8, 1997.

28 Applicable international instruments, in addition to the ICCPR, include the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

29 Including the instruments listed in supra note 28.

30 Paired with the limited policing capacity of KFOR and UNMIK Police. See Section IV.A.

31 The Economic Reconstruction pillar, led by the European Union, is also relevant, through its responsibility for financing the running of Government institutions including the justice system.

32 Initially, the Judicial Affairs Office, which answers to the head of the Civil Affairs component, also had responsibility for legal policy issues and legislative reforms. However, responsibility for these two tasks was recently transferred within the competency of the Senior Legal Advisor to the SRSG who answers directly to the latter. See Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of September 16, 1999, UN Document S/1999/987, at para. 31.

33 See Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of June 12, 1999, UN Document S/1999/779, at para. 85.

34 The Rule of Law Division is also responsible for the development of an Ombudsman institution.

35 A variety of other agencies also cooperate in various activities related to the justice system, including the Council of Europe (particularly on training issues) and NGOs such as the American Bar Association: Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI). KFOR, too, plays an important role, providing security and transport for judicial officials in some areas, and sometimes also translation services.

36 Those appointed include the head of office, one person in charge of prison management, and two working on the court and prosecution system.

37 The explanations for the slow arrival of staff echoed those given to Human Rights First during its first visit two months earlier: general problems with the UN bureaucracy as well as difficulties in finding qualified staff willing to work in Kosovo under difficult circumstances.

38 Interview with Human Rights First on September 29, 1999

39 It may also give advice on other issues related to the judicial system, upon request from the SRSG. Regulation No. 1999/7 of September 7, 1999. The Judicial Advisory Commission will be composed of eight local and three international experts.

40 This body, which consisted of four local and three international experts, had been set up by the then acting SRSG’s Emergency Decree No. 1999/1 of June 28, 1999. Regulation No. 1999/7 repeals this Emergency Decree, and also Emergency Decree No. 1999/2 which appointed the members of the Joint Advisory Council, but specifies that judges and prosecutors provisionally appointed pursuant to these decrees shall continue to hold office until their respective terms expire.

41 Regulation No. 1999/6 of September 7, 1999. This Commission will be composed of 10 local and five international members.

42 It shall also advise the SRSG on the early re-establishment of the Supreme Court of Kosovo, after appropriate consultations with the Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Matters and the Advisory Judicial Commission.

43 Initially, its judges and prosecutors operated as mobile units, conducting detention hearings in the various KFOR bases throughout Kosovo.

44 Six criminal law judges and two civil law judges.

45 Seven criminal law judges and three prosecutors, appointed on July 17, 1999.

46 Seven criminal law judges and two prosecutors, appointed on August 31, 1999.

47 Eight criminal law judges and three prosecutors, appointed on September 7, 1999.

48 Regulation No. 1999/4 of September 4, 1999.

49 All five judges and two prosecutors at the appeals level are Kosovar Albanians.

50 Thus far, lay judges have been appointed only in one of the District Courts, Prizren.

51 Most of the newly appointed judges and prosecutors worked as lawyers during the past 10 years. Some did not work in the legal profession during that time.

52 The requirements are: three years for the position of a Municipal Court judge or prosecutor; seven years for a District Court judge or prosecutor; and four years for a Commercial Court judge. Section 6, Regulation No. 1999/8.

53 The first such session, a "Background Symposium for Newly Appointed Judges and Prosecutors," was held in Pristina on September 24-25, 1999. It was organized by OSCE’s Rule of Law Division in partnership with the Council of Europe, the US Department of Justice and ABA-CEELI. Approximately one third of the newly appointed judges and prosecutors participated. Over the coming weeks, the symposium will be repeated twice for the remaining judges and prosecutors. Unfortunately, the symposium focused on the European Convention alone and failed to include standards enunciated by the UN in various international instruments on the independence of the judiciary, fair trials, detention and role of prosecutors.

54 Articles 190ss of the FRY Code of Criminal Procedure.

55 For the sake of brevity, these proceedings will be referred to as "war crimes" cases.

56 These cases involve groups of, respectively, three and four Serbs from Orahovac who have been arrested by Dutch and German KFOR troops.

57 Investigators have already uncovered 400 sites of mass graves and extensive testimony and other evidence of atrocities. UNMIK, Update, October 14, 1999.

58 Office of the Prosecutor: ICTY Position Statement regarding Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes committed in Kosovo, September 29, 1999, at para. 5 in fine.

59 Id., at para. 6.

60 It is worth noting that the right to legal counsel before trial and to access to a lawyer is one area in which the FRY Code of Criminal Procedure is not in conformity with international standards. Council of Europe experts have recommended that the relevant provisions should be suspended or amended as a matter of priority. However, for the most part, they are no longer applied in practice: Kosovar Albanian lawyers had long suffered under the restrictive provisions of the FRY Code of Criminal Procedure and know them only too well. All lawyers interviewed by Human Rights First during its mission expressed their satisfaction that, for the first time in their professional lives, they were able to have access to their clients from the very beginning of proceedings. However, as the cases described in this section indicate, this may not extend equally to all categories of defendants.

61 Anyone who might be testifying in favor of a Serb accused of war crimes in the future is likely to be at risk of reprisal. One case reported to Human Rights First during its mission was that of an ethnic Albanian witness living in the northern part of Mitrovica. In the absence of a witness protection system in place for those testifying before the domestic courts or KFOR, this case was apparently resolved by taking the witness to a foreign country. It was explained to Human Rights First that the ICTY was considering the need for witness protection measures for Serbs and Roma who spoke to the Tribunal, as well as Albanians who were seen as "collaborators," due to their links with the former regime.

62 Expulsions of Serbs from their houses in Prizren under death threats, and subsequent burning of the houses, continue to take place on an almost daily basis.

63 Lawyers Committee interview on September 29, 1999.

64 Lawyers Committee interview on October 2, 1999.

65 Lawyers Committee interview on September 27, 1999.

66 Lawyers Committee interview on October 2, 1999.

67 According to some sources, thus far there have been virtually no investigations. But even if investigations were to be completed, none of the District Courts—with the exception of Prizren—are ready for trials, as lay judges have not yet been appointed.

68 The Human Rights Chamber established in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Dayton Peace Agreement, which is composed of four members appointed by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and two members appointed by the Republika Srpska, on the one hand, and eight international members on the other, may serve as a model.

69 Some 50 persons are currently said to be held at a detention facility set up by UNMIK Police in Pristina. The civilian prison in Istok, parts of which have been rebuilt by KFOR, has not yet opened due to lack of civilian prison staff available to run it.

70 In many cases, those arrested by KFOR have been released shortly thereafter, often for lack of detention space. Before the current courts were established, KFOR initally relied solely on an internal system of detention reviews: legally trained KFOR personnel reviewed the evidence related to each case and, based on the rules and standards contained in their own national legislations, decided whether the person concerned should be released or kept in detention. Such review took place within 48 hours of the arrest. In early August, mobile units began to travel to the various KFOR detention facilities, in order to ensure compliance with the 72 hour requirement provided for in Article 196 (3) of the FRY Criminal Code, but KFOR legal personnel continue to carry out their own review within 48 hours.

71 Human Rights First could not obtain complete statistics. By way of indication, as of September 21, 1999, the mobile units had reviewed 311 cases involving 658 people, 259 of whom had been released.

72 Human Rights First was told that in a number of cases the suspects released on bail had left Kosovo.

73 In one such case brought to the attention of Human Rights First during the mission, a UNMIK Police officer had conducted extensive investigations into the case where a woman had been beaten, threatened and forced out of her apartment. The officer identified the perpetrator, a Kosovar Albanian, and arrested him. The suspect was said to have been implicated in several other, similar cases. The police officer submitted a detailed report on his investigations to the court. On the next morning, however, a panel of three judges decided to release the man.

74 KFOR legal staff expressed their concern at this situation, which they considered to be not appropriate. However, KFOR felt compelled to provide its own translators in cases where the court translators provided by OSCE were not proficient in legal terminology.

75 This includes KFOR soldiers who have left Kosovo as well as others. For example, Human Rights First was told of an elderly Serb couple who were attacked by an ethnic Albanian, left after the incident and were therefore not available for questioning. There are no resources available for bringing witnesses back to Kosovo to testify.

76 This case concerned an incident in which a man had fired at KFOR soldiers. The soldiers’ tour of duty in Kosovo had ended, and their sworn, written statements had apparently not been taken into account by the investigating judge.

77 See Section III.B.1.a.

78 Human Rights First was told that allegations of judicial corruption have been increasing.

79 This was the expression used by one official interviewed by Human Rights First on September 27, 1999. On October 1, 1999, another one commented that "the KLA can do what they like, and they do."

80 "Support Dwindles for Kosovo Rebels," Washington Post, October 17, 1999.

81 This stipend was paid between July 20 and 25, 1999. Human Rights First was informed that other categories of staff working in the justice system received lower stipends, ranging from DM300 (US$170) for professional assistants to DM100 (US$57) for general labor staff.

82 Human Rights First was told that, in the area of the judiciary, funds to cover start-up costs were provided by the UN from money provided by donors to a special trust fund, but this was not intended to cover the running costs of judicial institutions. The salaries of personnel in the judiciary, as well as other public servants, will eventually be paid out of the budget for government institutions, under UNMIK’s Economic Reconstruction component, which is led by the EU.

83 Professional assistants will receive DM200 (US$114), general labor staff DM100 (US$57).

84 UNMIK Press Release, UNMIK starts second round of stipend payments, October 1, 1999.

85 It was noted that the expected salary for a judge was less than half the salary of a janitor or driver working for UNMIK.

86 Lawyers Committee interview on September 28, 1999.

87 See above at Section III.B.1.c.

88 The use of international legal advisors in Cambodian courts may serve as a model for this approach

89 .Human Rights First was told that, in the case of the U.S., many of the lower-ranking officers express frustration at the conservative approach and would like to be more active.

90 This appears to be due, to some extent, to limited resources and, in particular, detention space. Initial reluctance of some contingents to arrest people was explained by the fact that these contingents did not have legally qualified personnel and were therefore not in a position to guarantee reviews of arrest and/or detention.

91 Human Rights First heard disturbing accounts of organized criminal activity in various areas of Kosovo. In the Prizren region, in particular, there are reports of an increasing presence of gangs from Albania.

92 In the words of one official met by Human Rights First during its visit, in some areas, organized crime and KLA involvement are even "coextensive." Lawyers Committee interview on September 27, 1999.

93 Lawyers Committee interview on September 27, 1999.

94 Lawyers Committee interview on October 1, 1999.

95 UNMIK, Status Report, October 7, 1999, available at: http://www.un.org.

96 See Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of September 16, 1999, UN Document S/1999/987, at para. 29.

97 UNHCR, Kosovo Humanitarian Update No.12, September 23, 1999.

98 The initial training program contains only one hour of human rights training, despite a wealth of international standards on human rights and policing. The content of that one hour is also designed ineffectively: the program is essentially a restatement of dry legal principles without context or examples of application.

99 Students chosen for advanced management training will receive additional training at the end of the mentoring program. Middle-level management trainees will undergo a further mentorship with counterparts at UNIP headquarters around Kosovo. Those tapped for upper-level management will spend six months in another country shadowing police executives.

100 However, steps have been taken to have the "blue book" printed in Geneva and possibly in Kosovo and distributed among international police officers as well as police school students.

101 UNMIK Updates, August 26 and 30, 1999.

102 The relatively high percentage of women (22%) in the first class is to be welcomed. Human Rights First was told that the director of the KPS is committed to raise the proportion of women in later classes.

103 Lawyers Committee interview on October 1, 1999.

104 One official who spoke to Human Rights First during its visit, referring to interaction between students, stated that he was "personally amazed at how well this is working."

105 The fact that negotiations between school officials and KLA leaders over the composition of the class even took place is a strong sign that loyalties of the service may already be divided.

106 Even if some KLA involvement is unavoidable, UN and OSCE officials should be careful about how close these ties are, especially given the documented KLA involvement in organized criminal activity.

107 Regulation No. 1999/8 of September 20, 2024 on the Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps.

108 "Kosovo defense chief accused of war crimes," Times Newspapers Ltd., October 10, 1999.

109 Article 8 (f), The KPC, Commander Kosovo Force’s Statement of Principles, September 20, 1999, on file with Human Rights First.

110 Section 1.2, Regulation No. 1999/8 of September 20, 1999.

111 This would implement the Secretary General’s directive setting out rules of humanitarian law that apply in peacekeeping operations, in effect as of August 12, 1999. [Secretary General’s Bulletin, Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, August 10, 1999]

112 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of September 16, 1999, UN Document S/1999/987, at para. 45.

113 Id., at para. 46.