Introduction
The last fifteen years have witnessed a dramatic shift from authoritarian to
democratic forms of governance in most of Latin America. States attempting to
consolidate still-fragile democratic reforms are turning to the judiciary to
institutionalize and enforce the new rules for the maintenance of democratic
order. Many Latin American judicial systems, however, are institutionally weak,
heavily politicized and corroded by corruption, and thus unable, absent
significant reforms, to serve as independent and effective guarantors of
political and economic rights. Many governments have sought external financial
assistance to address these problems. The World Bank has been the most
significant non-state actor in the field since the early 1990s, though the U.S.
Agency for International Development has made grants and technical assistance in
the region since the mid 1980's, and the Inter-American Development Bank began
to invest in legal reform in 1994.
This report examines the Bank's first loan dedicated solely to judicial
reform, the $60-million Venezuela Judicial Infrastructure Project (supported by
a $30-million Bank loan), approved in 1992. The Venezuela project (the Project)
has been "marketed" as the Bank's flagship investment in this area, setting the
stage for a number of other judicial reform projects in Latin America and
elsewhere. It has unfortunately demonstrated — at times, in a particularly
dramatic way — the problems inherent in trying to undertake a judicial reform
project without broad government, judiciary and civil society commitment and
participation. Although the Project is finally underway — it was delayed for two
years by political turmoil in Venezuela — the Lawyers Committee and Provea
believe that it can still be substantially strengthened with the participation
of government and non-government actors interested in reform. Important steps
have already been taken in this direction.
The World Bank and Judicial
Reform
In its efforts to promote economic development, the World Bank has come to
view respect for the rule of law as necessary for the provision of a stable and
predictable environment for economic transactions. The absence of a functioning
legal framework could, in the Bank's view, "greatly hinder development,
discourage and distort trade and investment, raise transaction costs and foster
corruption."
While the Bank may assist member states with reform efforts, it has concluded
that its charter limits the kinds of reform initiatives it can support. Article
IV of the charter directs the Bank and its staff to consider only economic
issues in lending decisions and prohibits the Bank from interfering in the
political affairs of its members. The Bank's General Counsel has stated that
these provisions restrict Bank involvement to projects that are related to the
development of a legal framework appropriate to a market economy and that any
Bank-financed reform initiative must have "direct and obvious" implications for
economic development.
This interpretation of the charter has created tensions in the Bank's
approach to reform, particularly in relation to the issues of judicial
independence and autonomy. The tension arises when the achievement of the reform
goal of a judiciary able to make fair, consistent and transparent decisions runs
up against the necessity for constitutional changes in the manner in which
judges are selected, governed and removed. This tension was resolved at the
beginning of Bank involvement in judicial reform by avoiding the structural
(constitutional) issues entirely and focusing instead on reforming the
administration of the judicial system. Consistent with the Bank's early view of
its role in legal reform, the Venezuela Project was originally designed to focus
on administrative and management reforms and the training of judges.
A 1995 Bank report on its early activities in this area reached a number of
important conclusions. The review asserted that: i) the role of the reforming
state is critical to the success of any judicial program; reform should not be
imposed from outside; ii) reform measures benefit from a prior comprehensive
diagnostic study that lays the groundwork for a comprehensive strategy; iii)
judicial reform should be viewed as a long-term process, with states
prioritizing reform measures and phasing them in over time; iv) judicial sector
reform should be centrally coordinated from within the country, as reform
programs often involve or affect several governmental organizations with diverse
and sometimes competing interests; and v) reform should not be a closed
operation between the Bank and the justice ministry but should reflect the
participation of those individuals and groups in the country particularly
affected by reform — the judiciary, bar associations, lawyers, and law
professors. The Lawyers Committee and Provea believe that these "lessons" — with
a few additions and some important clarifications — are crucial for the success
of judicial reform. As noted in the critique of the Bank's role in the Venezuela
Project, the Bank's record to date in each of these areas has, unfortunately,
been mixed at best.
The Venezuelan Judicial
Sector
Although Venezuela's Constitution established an independent judiciary, the
role of the courts was marginalized by the efforts of the party-controlled state
to provide for the economic, social and cultural development of its citizens.
The parties came to dominate all aspects of social and economic life, and led to
the heavy politicization of — and corruption in — most state functions,
including the judiciary. In the 1980s, the break-down of OPEC and the dramatic
fall of international oil prices triggered an economic and political crisis
which shook Venezuela's party-dominated political structure to its roots. The
austerity measures imposed by President Carlos Andrés Pérez to address the
country's economic problems led to daily protests which were often violently
repressed by the police. The resulting political unrest, including two coup
attempts in 1992, buffeted Pérez and corruption charges finally drove him from
office in 1993. After a brief pause during the interim Velázquez administration,
the unrest has continued under President Caldera.
In many ways, the judiciary symbolized all that had gone wrong with
Venezuela's political system. The roots of the crisis in the judiciary
intertwine several areas: political interference, corruption, institutional
neglect, and the failure to provide access to justice for the vast part of the
Venezuelan population.
The administrative and management problems resulting from years of
institutional neglect and the lack of judicial training are areas the Project
specifically targets. However, the extraordinary corrosion of the judicial
function brought about by extensive political interference and corruption are
areas neither the Bank, the Judicial Council, the Congress or the President have
yet to address credibly. The most egregious manifestation of the collapse of the
judicial sector, beyond the disdain for the courts reflected in the citizenry,
has been the wholesale eclipse of the fundamental role of judges in the
protection of the human rights of Venezuelan citizens.
Human Rights in
Venezuela
The violent repression of social protest in the wake of President Pérez'
austerity measures left hundreds dead. By 1992, the list of problems had become
lengthy, including persistent arbitrary and excessively lengthy detentions,
abuse of detainees, extrajudicial killings by the police and military, the
failure to punish police and security officers accused of abuses, corruption and
gross inefficiency in the judicial and law enforcement systems, deplorable
prison conditions, a lack of respect for the rights of indigenous peoples`, and
violence and discrimination against women.
The economic and social rights of Venezuelans have also deteriorated
significantly during this period, particularly following the launch in 1989 of
the World Bank/IMF-assisted structural adjustment program. Several years of high
inflation, currency devaluation and diminishing government social spending have
contributed to a dramatic rise in poverty and its attendant social and health
ills. These conditions served to increase social unrest, as well as the
possibility of inappropriate or excessive reaction by the governmental
authorities.
Recent Venezuelan presidents have returned to a tradition of suspending
constitutional guarantees whenever an economic or political crisis appears.
President Carlos Andrés Pérez suspended guarantees after each of the 1992 coup
attempts; in June 1994, President Caldera suspended several constitutional
guarantees, allegedly to address the economic crisis triggered by the
collapse of the banking sector. Although purportedly based on an economic need,
the government took advantage of the suspension to take aggressive actions far
removed from the economic sphere, including numerous raids in poor urban areas
of Caracas, and the detention of social activists, popular leaders, and members
of leftist parties.
These violations of the human rights of Venezuelan citizens have continued
unabated in recent years in large part because those officials responsible have
acted with de facto impunity and citizens have not had access to a
judiciary free of executive and party control.
The Struggle for
Reform
Judicial reform had been nominally on the Venezuelan political agenda for a
number of years prior to the development of the World Bank Project. In 1984, the
Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State (COPRE) was created to
develop proposals for the modernization of the Venezuelan state and to draft the
legislation and constitutional changes necessary to permit the implementation of
the recommendations. In 1990, COPRE set forth detailed recommendations for
judicial administrative and code reform, bills subsequently introduced into the
Congress were immediately tabled by opposition to judicial reform and the
political crisis triggered by President Pérez' economic reforms. The Pérez
cabinet and the Judicial Council ended up negotiating an agreement with the Bank
to pursue administrative reforms through the Judicial Council, which would not
require legislative approval. The Project thus focused on improving the
management and operation of the judicial system and the training of judges,
gambling that changes in court and case management, if successful, would serve
to stimulate broader reforms later. The Bank's Board approved the Project in
August 1992. The final step in project approval required the signing of the loan
documents by the Bank and the Venezuelan government.
However, the Project stalled in the chaos generated by the economic and
political tumult. President Pérez' ouster from office in May 1993 put the Bank
in the position of re-presenting the Project to an interim government, some of
whom did not support the Project. In addition, Rafael Caldera, elected president
in December 1993, was a staunch opponent of Bank involvement in Venezuelan
economic policy. Only at the very last moment, on December 31, 1993, did the
government authorize execution of the loan documents.
Evaluation of the Bank's
Role
Although Venezuela was the Bank's first free-standing judicial reform
project, it has since responded to requests for assistance in this area from
other governments in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. This role gives the
Bank a great degree of influence to affect the shape of reform. The influence
derives from the kind of programs it is willing to finance itself and its
willingness to insist that a state commit itself to certain reforms as a
prerequisite to Bank involvement.
Recent Bank policy statements suggest that judicial reform programs should
"address the political, economic and legal causes at the root of an inefficient
and inequitable judiciary," recognizing that "if such a holistic approach is not
adopted, there will be a minimal probability for success." Basic elements should
include "measures with respect to guaranteeing judicial independence."
In evaluating the Bank's performance in Venezuela, several problems surface:
i) the Project was not part of a comprehensive reform strategy; ii) the was no
broad government commitment to reform; iii) reform strategies failed to address
crucial structural impediments to judicial independence; iv) the reform
strategies were premised on artificial economic and non-economic distinctions in
key areas; v) access to justice concerns were not addressed; and vi) there was
no broad-based participation in the design and development of the Project.
Comprehensive
Reform
The methodological debate over the proper approach to reform involves two
issues. First, should a state develop a comprehensive, long-term plan for
reform, based on a diagnostic study of the entire judicial sector, before Bank
involvement in discreet reform initiatives? And, second, how should reform be
sequenced — should constitutional and legislative measures precede other
reforms? The consensus among those with experience with judicial system reform
efforts, including the World Bank, is that reform should occur within the
context of a comprehensive, long-term strategy.
Comprehensive reform requires that a government — in conjunction with the
broad range of actors in civil society — acknowledge the fundamental impediments
to the functioning of the rule of law and the source of failure to protect
constitutionally guaranteed economic, political, civil, social and cultural
rights. A genuine reform effort contemplates the involvement of all judicial
system actors in order to secure administrative and procedural coordination, and
it logically sequences institutional changes and budgetary resources — and
financing from international sources — for each reform phase or project.
An incremental initiative such as the Venezuela Project often lacks the base
of support within the branches of government, political parties and civil
society to guarantee the long-run viability of the project's reforms. The
Project's improvements, however meritorious, may well be short-lived if the
courts remain heavily influenced by political and private economic interests.
One of the assumptions underlying an incremental approach to reform is that
judicial independence is ultimately a characteristic of the way judges act, that
is, of judicial character and culture, not the result of constitutional or
legislative norms designed to provide greater institutional distance between the
judicial system and political influences. While such an assumption may be
reasonable, the reform sequencing implications that follow conflict with broader
reform principles, in particular the need for broad government commitment
prior to the initiation of a reform plan involving the entire judicial
system, supported with input from the government, the legal community and
relevant representatives of civil society.
The Project ended up adopting (if not developing) a judge-first strategy as
early work revealed a need to move beyond judiciary infrastructure improvements
and focus on the manner in which judges perform their work. Consequently,
neither the Bank nor the Judicial Council desired much exposure for the Project
(even within the judiciary) until the development of management reforms and a
core of reform judges were well under way. As a result, the Project seems to
have survived (barely) the 1992-94 economic and political crises, but with no
broad support or consensus on the direction reform should take.
Government
Commitment
In order for legal technical assistance to bring about the desired results,
recipient governments "need to establish law reform agendas and prioritize areas
where legal assistance is most needed." As the Bank concedes, "[u]nless a
country is committed to reforming its legal regime . . . legal technical
assistance may be a waste of resources."
No such commitment was ever requested of the Venezuelan government. In fact,
as noted earlier, the Congress had demonstrated no enthusiasm for legal reform,
refusing to address the legislative changes proposed by COPRE between 1987 and
1991. The value of the Pérez administration's commitment to reform evaporated
with Pérez' ouster on corruption charges in May 1993. By the middle of 1993, not
a single government minister involved in the development of the Project remained
in office; entering 1994, therefore, the Bank had almost no official base of
support for the Project.
Judicial
Independence
The most serious problems of the Venezuelan courts — arbitrariness,
corruption, delays — grow out of the lack of institutional independence of the
judicial sector. While the Bank fully agrees that judicial independence is the
critical issue in most Latin American states, and certainly in Venezuela, none
of these elements has yet been addressed in the Venezuela Project.
The Bank's "Economic"
Focus
Bank-supported judicial reform initiatives have stressed distinctions between
what are deemed economic and non-economic elements of judicial systems. There is
a Bank proclivity to work on commercial codes and civil procedures but to avoid
penal issues and procedures and judicial entities that may protect
constitutional rights generally but are not seen to have "direct" relevance for
commerce or investment. Part of this discrete focus grows out of the Bank's
concern about remaining within the scope of its charter mandate and part from
the assumption that what investors and merchants primarily seek from judicial
systems.
The Lawyers Committee and Provea believe such distinctions are artificial.
While there is little research documenting the link between the performance of
courts and economic development, available evidence suggests that political
predictability is probably the more important variable in attracting
investment. Moreover, the concerns expressed by foreign and domestic investors
about the reliability of the judicial system appear to be a subset of a much
broader concern about "judicial insecurity" arising from the fear that
fundamental civil and political rights — the right to be free from arbitrary
arrest and imprisonment, the right to fair pretrial and trial procedures, the
right to be free of unconstitutional actions taken by the government — cannot be
vindicated by a deeply politicized and corrupt judiciary. Economic issues are
also implicated in the ability of many Latin American presidents to rule by
decree or through the authority of broad emergency legislation without effective
judicial oversight. Whether concerned about human rights, economic reforms or
investments, none are secure if an executive can so easily and arbitrarily
change a government's course.
Access to Justice
The ability of those with fewer resources to use the courts is a key
measurement of the functioning of a judicial system. Access is critical for
small business persons attempting to enforce contracts or defend intellectual
property as well as individuals attempting to vindicate human rights guarantees.
In fact, access to justice is an area that implicates the Bank's "overarching
objective" of poverty alleviation. The Venezuela Project does not include an
access-to-justice component, even though the courts are out-of-reach for most of
the Venezuelan population.
Participation
Although long-criticized for failure to include non-governmental "consumers"
in the design and implementation of economic development projects, the Bank has
in recent years moved to increase the "participation" of a broader array of
"stakeholders" in the projects it funds, recognizing that "[t]here is
significant evidence that participation can, in many circumstances, improve the
quality, effectiveness and sustainability of projects, and strengthen ownership
and commitment of government and stakeholders."
Yet participation was not a recognized Bank policy in 1990, when discussions
concerning the Venezuelan project began. Not surprisingly, many major actors in
the judicial system — the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor most
prominently — had very little input, and almost no actors in civil society —
academia, bar associations, law faculties, NGOs — were contacted. More
surprising is that only a handful of judges were consulted and the vast majority
knew little of the contents of the Project other than that which they had read
in newspapers as late as May 1995.
In spite of the expressed willingness of Bank officials and the Judicial
Council to begin to reach out to civil society, the Project is only slowly
emerging from the cloak of secrecy which has covered it since its inception.
Coordination of Donor
Involvement
Because of its global scope and interdisciplinary expertise, the Bank views
itself as well-positioned to act as coordinator of external legal technical
assistance in its borrowing member countries. Yet coordination of activities
among the various multilateral and bilateral donors is haphazard. Moreover,
serious coordination problems exist among the four entities in the Venezuelan
government which comprise the judicial sector. The Bank attempted to address
this problem at the outset by establishing an inter-agency project advisory
committee, but with nothing directly at stake in the Project, interest in the
committee diminished and it ceased to function.
The Project on Its
Merits
The Project does address a limited number of the difficulties plaguing the
court system. Its broadest focus is on the catastrophic state of judicial
administration and court and case management. And in proposing to strengthen the
ability of the Judicial Council to actually manage and plan for over 1,000
courts, the Project is laced with studies that are to precede the development of
new administrative procedures and technology systems. At the planning stages,
then, the Bank seems to be taking a prudent approach to administrative
restructuring.
The most dramatic change suggested for the courts by the Project is the
manner in which individual judges work. Several new pilot courtroom models are
to be tested in a number of different regions. The Project may also provide the
basis for improved responsiveness from public defenders. And the revival of the
judicial school is critical for preparation for the judicial career and
continuing education for sitting judges. Finally, the Project provides a basis
for follow-on proposals through a series of studies of various issues related to
the functioning of the judiciary.
The success of these modest proposals, of course, depends upon factors
originally avoided by the Bank and the Judicial Council: the depolitization of
the courts and the Judicial Council, the weeding out corruption, and the
political commitment to provide the resources for an independent judicial sector
during years of economic crisis. Problems continue to plague the Project, now
four years after Board approval. The government still has no broad reform
strategy, the breadth and depth of its interest in substantive reform is
unclear, and Judicial Council and Bank promises to expand participation are only
slowly being realized.
A. Conclusions
The World Bank has become a major actor in judicial and legal reform efforts
in Latin America at a critical juncture in the democratization process now
underway in almost all countries in Central and South America. At stake is the
ability of the judiciary to check the power of governments and protect the
rights of all actors — individuals, groups and other entities — while preserving
the state's ability to vindicate legitimate government interests.
Judicial reform is the responsibility of governments — particularly the tasks
of developing a consensus on the need for and scope of reform and the design of
a long-term reform strategy. The Bank provides advice to governments on reform
strategy and offers technical and financial support for discreet reform
initiatives. In this critique, the Lawyers Committee and Provea have focused on
the content of the Bank's advice and the conditions under which it participates
in reform projects while emphasizing that the overall responsibility for reform
lies with the states themselves.
Within this context, the Bank's role in the design and implementation of the
Venezuela reform project raises a number of serious concerns.
-
The Venezuela Project was not designed as a component of a comprehensive
long-term reform program. A comprehensive plan means more than identifying the
range of problems plaguing a judicial system; its real importance lies in
developing and sequencing reform initiatives in a logical progression,
eventually including all of the system's actors, each of whose operations
affects the ability of the rest to function efficiently and fairly. The
development of such a plan is not the responsibility of the Bank but rather the
government seeking to improve its judicial system. The Bank can and should,
however, insist that reform (including any Bank projects) be based on a
long-range strategy that involves all judicial sectors and identifies needed
constitutional and legislative changes. That strategy, in turn, should grow out
of a detailed judicial sector analysis and broad public consultation. No such
plan has been developed in Venezuela even though the need for judicial reform
has been a major political issue for several years.
-
Since the Project only focused on providing institutional support and
infrastructure improvements for the Judicial Council and was not developed in
the context of a wider program, the most serious problems in the Venezuelan
judiciary — lack of judicial independence from political influence and
corruption — were not addressed.
-
No broad government commitment to reform was obtained prior to the decision
to go forward with the Project. The Bank essentially — and, as it turns out,
disastrously — relied upon the support of President Carlos Andrés Pérez for the
Project's political viability. It was almost terminated during the waning days
of the Velázquez interim presidency. One result of the lack of an executive and
congressional consensus on the scope of reform is a fragmented, uncoordinated
discussion of reform options among ministries and legislative committees. One
proposal now under review would eliminate the Judicial Council, the heart of the
existing Project, and give to the Supreme Court the responsibility to administer
the appellate and lower courts.
-
The scope and content of the Project were negotiated between the Bank, the
Judicial Council and the Pérez administration with very limited input from the
judicial and legal community and the private sector and no input from NGOs or
the general public.
-
Participation in the Project remains limited to the judicial sector, in spite
of the widespread calls across Venezuelan society for fundamental reform of the
court system. The Project has not (yet) served as a catalyst for discussions of
broader reform; it has remained largely hidden from public view. The Judicial
Council has, however, responded positively to the interest of Provea and the
Lawyers Committee in the Project and is discussing ways to open the Project to
broader participation.
B. Recommendations to the World
Bank
With Regard to Judicial Reform Generally:
In recent publications reviewing its role in judicial reform programs, the
Bank has set forth a judicial reform strategy that emphasizes the need for
judicial reform to take place within the context of long-term plans
incorporating both the structural reforms required to support greater judicial
independence and organizational and administrative reforms to improve the
day-to-day operations of the courts and the performance of judges. This
strategy, which also stresses widespread participation in the development and
implementation of reform projects, reflects, in principle, many of the views of
the Lawyers Committee and Provea outlined in this report. This document has also
demonstrated, however, that most of those Bank principles were not applied to
the Venezuela Project. While Bank policy and practice are developing with each
new reform project, concerns about similar gaps between Bank policy and practice
have been noted by NGOs following judicial reform in other countries. Therefore,
the Lawyers Committee and Provea would like to emphasize a number of points
applicable to reform efforts generally:
- In assessing whether to respond to a government's request for judicial
reform assistance, the Bank should give highest priority to the demonstration of
government commitment to broad reform, particularly if political interference is
a serious obstacle to the proper administration of justice. "Demonstrated"
commitment should come in the form of concrete measures (such as reforming the
way judges are selected) implemented prior to or contemporaneously with a
Bank-financed initiative.
- To help design a reform program that reflects broad social concerns about
the judiciary (as well as to guarantee multi-year support for comprehensive
reform), the Bank should seek to ensure that all sectors of society have an
opportunity to participate in the development of a reform package. This
participation should occur from the beginning of the process in accordance with
a participation plan. The Bank should view individuals and organizations in
civil society as allies (as well as the Bank's ultimate clients) whose ideas and
support can greatly enhance the chances for success of Bank projects in this
area.
- Access to justice problems for all citizens should be addressed in each
reform plan and included in Bank components or other initiatives.
With Regard to the Venezuela Project:
1. The Bank and Judicial Council should encourage an expansion of the role of
the Project in the judicial reform discussions currently underway in Venezuela,
utilizing the Project as the basis for broader follow-on reform initiatives of
both an institutional and an administrative nature. The Bank should facilitate
this process within the scope of its existing work as follows:
a. Recommend the reactivation of the Project oversight committee with broad
policy responsibility for the overall direction of the Project. The oversight
committee should continue to include the officials heading the several judicial
sector entities (Supreme Court, Judicial Council, Ministry of Justice, Public
Ministry, Military Courts) but should be expanded to include representatives
from the legislature, COPRE, the legal profession, the bar associations, the
lower-court judges, the law schools, and organizations in civil society. The
oversight committee might be an appropriate body to coordinate ongoing reform
efforts, given its intergovernmental character, and to educate the public on
reform issues.
b. Utilize existing funds allocated for studies to broaden the analysis of
the judicial system's problems and to develop proposals for follow-on reform
projects. A reconstituted oversight committee could supervise the development of
new studies, which would most likely look at the functioning of the judicial
sector entities not currently the focus of reform activities.
c. Establish a mechanism to coordinate with other multilateral and bilateral
entities active in the judicial reform area for assistance with immediate reform
needs not addressed by the Project. The most pressing short-term concern is the
modernization and reform of criminal procedure and the institutions responsible
for assuring that criminal suspects are detained, interrogated, imprisoned and
tried fairly — the Ministry of Justice, the PTJ, the Public Prosecutor. Most
individual human rights violations occur in connection with police involved in
extrajudicial killings, warrantless arrests and torture during interrogation.
The courts must dramatically improve their ability to hold police accountable by
requiring proper warrants and providing prompt and fair
hearings.
2. Immediately develop and implement a participation plan to involve the
legal community and civil society in the remaining phases of the Project and any
follow-on initiatives.
Recent Project developments have left the Lawyers Committee and Provea
guardedly hopeful that the Venezuela initiative is beginning to expand its scope
to overcome some of its most serious design limitations. One shift has been to
move from working just with the Judicial Council to incorporate the judges (or
at least a number of judges) into the reform process. Reportedly, approximately
ten percent of Venezuela's judges have participated in reform-oriented workshops
and a group of these judges is taking an active role in training work within the
judiciary. A second shift has been the expression of interest of other judicial
sector actors, particularly the Supreme Court, in obtaining Bank assistance for
their own reform projects. A third change has been an expression of interest on
behalf of the Judicial Council (and the Bank) in opening up the reform process
to the participation of NGOs and other non-judiciary, non- governmental actors.
And, finally, it appears that the Bank is undertaking a broad assessment of the
Project which might set the stage for broader follow-on reform programs.
These are all positive, if small, steps in the right direction. As this
report goes to press, though, not enough information is available to assess the
effects of these shifts, nor what (if anything) the Bank or the Judicial Council
will recommend in terms of further expansion of the reform program. It remains
clear, though, that four years after Executive Board approval of the Project,
Venezuela has yet to begin the process of developing a consensus on the scope of
judicial reform or to demonstrate broad government commitment to the principle
of reform. While procuring consensus and commitment is not the responsibility of
the Bank, judicial reform efforts (including the Project) will not succeed in
their absence. Getting this process underway is still the major judicial reform
challenge in Venezuela today.
