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African Exodus: Refugee Crisis, Human Rights and the 1969 OAU Convention 1. Introduction Africa's refugee crisis is not going away.
Taking refugees together with
those displaced internally within national borders, approximately 20 million
Africans are currently uprooted from their homes by civil strife, social
breakdown, and persecution. The rights of African refugees are protected, in
theory at least, by what is widely believed to be the most progressive treaty
regime in the world: the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing
the Specific Aspects of Refugees in Africa (OAU Convention). Yet in practice the
OAU Convention has not prevented refugees from being subjected to military
attacks, physical abuse, expulsion, and restrictions on their rights. The
Lawyers Committee undertook this study with the aim of evaluating the successes
and failures of the OAU refugee system. In order to assess and report on the
state of protection for African refugees, the study aimed in particular to: This report attempts to show the intimate link between refugee rights and
human rights issues at every level. The reasons for a refugee's flight are
almost inevitably tied to abuses of human rights in the country of origin,
whether resulting from direct persecution or as consequences of larger conflicts
instigated by undemocratic governments or unrecognized regional or ethnic
claims. Furthermore, governments, international agencies and sometimes NGOs lose
sight of the fact that refugees are entitled not only to the special set of
rights laid down in international refugee treaties, but also the whole range of
civil and political, economic, social, and cultural rights contained in both the
UN and OAU treaties. This point is especially salient in the current context of
the growing complexity of the refugee crisis where issues of refugee protection
are becoming almost inextricably tied to issues of relief and humanitarian
assistance. 2. The Legal Framework of Refugee Protection
in Africa The quality of protection accorded to refugees depends upon the
implementation of international legal standards for the protection of refugees
on the domestic level by means of national legislation. International legal
standards, such as those contained in the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees 1951, provide a basis for examining the conduct of States towards
refugees in accordance with their obligations under international law. These
standards regarding refugees specifically, which establish general obligations
for States and contain civil, economic, and social rights for refugees on an
integrated basis, must be seen in the wider context of universal human rights
guaranteed in the Charter of the UN and the UNDHR. Entitlement to protection as a refugee is dependent upon fulfillment of the
requirements for refugee status in international law. Under the Convention, a
refugee is anyone who suffers a loss or lack of protection in the country of
origin due to a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her country of
origin. A central element of persecution seems to be the threat of violation or
actual violation of refugees' individual human rights. However, the Lawyers
Committee discovered that application of the "persecution-based criterion" in
Africa demonstrated a very restrictive attitude, reflecting in some cases
xenophobic concerns on the part of receiving countries. Individual status determination procedures in Africa often do not take into
account the principles which exclude protection to those refugees who have
committed crimes against peace, a war crime, or crimes against humanity; thus
several former African leaders have been granted asylum despite their deplorable
human rights records during their hold on power. Host countries must be assisted
to constitute special procedures to deal with such asylum seekers. In this
respect the current war crimes tribunals in Rwanda and Ethiopia are important to
follow given their potential preventative and curative consequences for refugee
flows elsewhere in Africa. Regional standards, such as the Convention Governing Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa (1969), are an effective regional complement to the
international standards. Regional standards must also be viewed in relation to
human rights instruments, particularly the African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights. The obligation of states to receive and secure settlement of refugees
within their territories may arguably be extended to all members of the OAU,
even those states which have not yet ratified the African Convention. The definition of refugee under the African Convention means in practice that
refugees may be admitted on a prima facie group basis; in this way, group
eligibility obviates the necessity for individual status determination.
Sometimes implementing provisions of the African Charter have meant restrictions
on the rights of refugees under the international Convention; for example, the
application of the principle of safe location has in some cases meant excessive
restrictions on the freedom of movement of refugees. The functions of domestic standards include: 1) the implementation of
international standards at the domestic level through legislation and; 2) the
provision of an internal legal and administrative framework for dealing with
refugee matters. Domestic legislation must always be seen in the context of
international standards and human rights. Special mention is made of francophone
countries who follow the civil law tradition which allows for the direct
implementation of international standards in domestic legislation without
special legislation. Modes of implementation otherwise vary greatly depending on
the degree to which they incorporate international standards. Refugee control
legislation such as that used in Tanzania, Botswana, and Zambia is found to be
very restrictive, while refugee laws in Sudan and Zimbabwe are held up as models
of progressive domestic legislation. 3. The Problem of Legal
Status Fundamental to the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers is the host
state's recognition of their legal status as refugees. While both individual
status criteria and prima facie group basis determination are often imperfect,
the implications for refugees who are not accorded any recognition at all are
potentially disastrous. For example, refugees in South Africa until very
recently suffered from the lack of any protection regime, leaving them
vulnerable to physical hazards such as electrification on the border fence,
exploitation as cheap labour, arrest, and deportation. For Mozambican refugees
the situation is particularly grim, given that Pretoria sponsored the war which
made Mozambique ungovernable and then refused refuge to the victims of that war
in violation of international law. Unfortunately, the positive changes ushered
in by South Africa's 1993 ratification of the 1951 Convention have been
compromised by a new wave of xenophobia in South Africa focussing on foreign
migrant workers. The legal status of refugees is a particular problem in West Africa as a
result of the 1975 treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), which enshrines the principle of mobility of labour and the
free movement of citizens within the community. These provisions have resulted
in a legal vacuum for refugees, who enjoy no specific guarantees of their
status, rights or protection. Liberian refugees in Cote d'Ivoire, for example,
are told by the Ivoirian government that they are not refugees but rather ECOWAS
nationals; on the other hand, in order to receive assistance the Liberians must
remain in designated camps which restricts their right to freedom of movement.
Many Liberian refugees must make a very difficult decision between receiving
assistance in rural areas or moving to urban centres and living in abject
poverty. The plight of Mauritanian refugees in Senegal highlights the importance
of recognition of legal status of refugees; whereas Senegal has ratified all
relevant treaties regarding refugees and has even enacted domestic legislation
guaranteeing additional rights of refugees, Mauritanian refugees enjoy none of
the basic rights and protection because the Senegalese authorities, for
political reasons, do not recognize them as refugees. Thus the Lawyers Committee
found that Mauritanian refugees suffered from widespread discrimination as soon
as they moved away from the border areas, in addition to indirect involuntary
repatriation without the benefit of international supervision to guarantee their
security. The situation of "urban refugees", usually prominent, urban and educated
people, illustrates some of the difficulties involved in determining legal
status on a case-by-case basis. Such refugees are often targets of xenophobic
sentiments arising from economic woes, such as has occurred in Kenya, or have no
access to independent advice to enable him or her to buttress their appeal for
asylum. While this is a basic structural flaw in the status determination
procedure in Zimbabwe, it is somewhat offset by the provision in Zimbabwean law
which stipulates that the Refugee Act overrides all other relevant legislation
in cases where they conflict. 4. The Physical Protection of
Refugees Refugees are by their nature vulnerable to a variety of physical attack,
either from forces in their own country hostile to their political/ethnic
affiliation, from bandits, from other ethnic groups or refugees in the host
country, and from forces in the host country whose obligation it is to protect
the very persons they are attacking. Females form a particularly vulnerable
subset of refugees, since they are all too often subjected to sexual abuse as
well as attacks on their physical integrity. The problem of protection is particularly acute when security forces of host
countries cannot, or do not, fulfill their obligation to ensure physical
protection of refugees. The persecution of Somali refugees in Kenya by
government forces is described in detail as an example of the likelihood of host
governments to extend ill-treatment of their own citizens to refugees within
their borders. The participation of Kenyan police and soldiers in the beating,
killing and raping of Somali refugees has gone virtually unpunished, and
refugees are reluctant to file complaints against the police for fear of
reprisals. The lack of physical security suffered by refugees in Cote d'Ivoire is
presented in support of the assertion that host governments almost invariably
have some stake in the conflict that has caused displacement of refugee
populations; often the host government will pursue a policy at odds with the
views of refugees within their borders. Thus Liberian refugees in Cote d'Ivoire
have been attacked by NPFL forces operating in border villages while the
Ivoirian authorities turned a blind eye; indeed, Krahns and other refugee groups
suspected of support for anti-NPFL factions have been under the threat of
arbitrary detention by the Ivoirian security forces and transfer into the hands
of the NPFL. The issue of refoulement is intimately tied up with the physical protection
of refugees. Despite the prohibition of refoulement in both the UN Convention
and the OAU Convention, often the cavalier attitude or the cynical self-interest
of host governments has trampled over the rights of refugees. Although actual
incidents of refoulement have significantly decreased in the 90s, the threat of
refoulement continues to hang over the heads of refugees. A recurrent theme throughout this chapter is the failure of members of the
international community, notably the UNHCR, to act effectively as an advocate
for refugee protection. Whether due to pusillanimity, under-representation, or
under-funding, the UNHCR has often been unable to fulfill its own protection
mandate, leaving refugees without independent protection against systematic
abuse or without avenues of redress. While the UNHCR has done much to improve
the practices of host governments (ie provision of rape counsellors in Kenya and
intervention in cases of refoulement), its continued adherence to the twin
fallacies of disinterested host governments and their expected conformity with
international standards despite domestic records of abuse will continue to
compromise refugees' guaranteed right to physical protection. In theory, refugees enjoy two overlapping sets of rights: those accorded to
them as individuals and guaranteed under international human rights law, and
specific rights relating to their status as refugees (ie right to asylum).
Individual human rights attach themselves to human beings, and are not
restricted to citizens of a state. In practice, however, the rights of refugees
as individuals are often restricted by host governments, often under the
misleading rubric of "security considerations." This chapter discusses a few of
the basic fundamental human rights as they are practicably applied to refugees
in countries visited by LCHR. 6. Protection in Mass Repatriation
Programs In contrast to the widespread assumption that refugees tend to remain in
their host countries due to economic motives, research conducted by the LCHR
revealed that an overwhelming majority of refugees were anxious to return home.
However, it is fundamental to the protection of refugees that their return be
voluntary in nature, and not forced upon them directly or indirectly through the
reduction of their economic or social benefits and rights. In this respect it is
necessary to address several important protection issues: Is it clear that the
refugees are returning to a situation where their human rights will be
respected? Has the conflict that caused the displacement in the first place
abated? Have physical hazards, such as land mines, been eliminated? Did refugees
have comprehensive and reliable information necessary for making a voluntary
decision to return? The fundamental issue underlying the repatriation process is one of freedom
of information. The people best placed to evaluate these issues are often
refugees themselves and, in the final analysis, basic knowledge will be more
valuable to them than complex, ill- suited logistical plans. The spontaneous
mass repatriation in 1992 of Mozambican refugees provides a useful case study
where refugees found their own solutions in the absence of an appropriate
repatriation plan under the auspices of the UNHCR. Also fundamental to the voluntary nature of return is the absence of pressure
applied through the reduction of food rations or other basic necessities. Donors
must accommodate the fact that during times of transition refugees will be
moving back and forth across borders, sometimes collecting rations on both
sides. Curtailing food rations may force refugees to return to an unstable
situation, precipitating another mass displacement. In situations of mass repatriation, it is essential that free transport and
other facilities be provided for vulnerable groups of refugees, such as
female-headed families and children. Leaving these groups until the end may
deprive them of their support groups in the camps and possibly after their
repatriation as well. In situations of mass repatriation, NGOs and other agencies situated in
countries of asylum can play an important role in promoting refugee rights and
protection. For example, NGOs in Malawi assisted refugees to remain informed of
the situation in Mozambique by providing batteries and radios; similarly, other
NGOs helped to educate refugees about the phenomenon of land mines, which had
claimed the lives of hundreds of returning refugees. 7. The Place and Role of the OAU Bureau for
Refugees Today the Bureau for Refugees (formally the Bureau for the Placement,
Education and Training of Refugees) continues to be the only organ within the
OAU devoted to the refugee issue, despite the growing complexity and scope of
the refugee crisis. However, underfunding, institutional politics, lack of
autonomy, and staffing difficulties have rendered the Bureau largely ineffectual
in dealing with the exigencies of the refugee crisis. In terms of fulfilling its
mandate, the Bureau has had limited success. While its education and training
scholarships have undoubtedly helped some refugees, the spectrum of refugees
affected is very small, with an evident bias in favour of male "urban" refugees.
The Bureau has ceased to meet its obligation to maintain a data-bank on the
"patterns, causes, and consequences" of refugee movements and to disseminate
information to those involved in the Africa refugee question; in this respect,
the Bureau must make efforts to revive the "Africa Refugees" publication. While
the intention to support income-generating projects (IGP) to enable refugees,
especially vulnerable refugees such as women, to become self-sufficient is a
laudable one, there seems to be no mechanism for evaluating the performance and
relevance of these projects; in some cases, the IGPs have had the undesirable
effect of perpetuating the oppression of women refugees. The Bureau is seriously constrained in the fulfillment of its role as a
mediator on behalf of refugees given its location within the Political
Department of the OAU Secretariat; the Bureau cannot issue public criticisms of
member states, nor vigorously urge them to adhere to their obligations under the
1969 Convention. Consequently, refugees continue to be subjected to abuse,
discrimination, expulsion and other forms of human rights violations. The Bureau
has a role to campaign for the implementation of domestic legislation that will
provide governments with the proper legal framework to facilitate the protection
of refugees. The changing nature of the refugee crisis in Africa from the time of the
Bureau's inception in 1968 raises questions about fundamental features of the
Bureau's mandate. For example, in order to effectively implement the principles
of the 1969 Convention, the Bureau must be liberated from the constraints
imposed by member states and be able to act independently. Additionally, other
questions, such as the status and position of refugee women and children, need
to be formally and fully integrated into the Bureau's program. In order to avoid becoming completely irrelevant as an actor in the
protection of African refugees, the Bureau of Refugees needs to embark upon a
critical re-evaluation of its present mandate and programs to ensure that the
Bureau's activities conform to the demands of the present refugee situation. 8. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees The UNHCR is the inter-governmental agency responsible for policing the 1969
UN Convention on Refugees, and is present wherever there are refugees in
significant numbers. A liberal interpretation of its mandate has meant that the
UNHCR has also come to monitor the implementation of the OAU Convention as well.
The UNHCR has a statutory protection role, and it is this protection role which
distinguishes it from other international aid agencies. In practice, however, the UNHCR has been hampered in its efforts to fulfill
its mandate by contradictions inherent in its nature. Primarily, the large
bureaucratic structure of the UNHCR makes it almost impossible for them to
respond in a flexible, creative manner to new situations as they occur.
Secondly, the twin functions of providing both relief and protection can mean
that sometimes UNHCR personnel are working at cross-purposes. For example, the
UNHCR may be unwilling to take a confrontational position towards the host
authorities on issues of physical protection of refugees in the interest of
maintaining good relations which facilitate aid distribution. The LCHR contends
that the UNHCR has more leverage with host governments than it likes to admit,
given the flow of foreign exchange that accompanies mass flows of refugees, and
the governments' unwillingness to deal with refugees on their own. The LCHR has identified two areas in particular where the UNHCR has failed to
fulfill its mandate for protection: 1) lack of physical presence in refugee
settlements and; 2) failure to provide independent legal representation. Due to
minimal presence in refugee camps, UNHCR personnel are unable to witness the
performance of the host security forces first hand, or be available for refugees
to lodge complaints. In some cases, UNHCR officers had no background experience
in protection issues at all. Due to the variety of abuses with which they are
faced, refugees are in constant need of independent advice and advocacy in order
to lodge complaints and receive redress from the host authorities. Although it
is theoretically the responsibility of the UNHCR to provide such representation,
in practice refugees perceive the UNHCR to be part and parcel of the host
government establishment. This 'misperception' is augmented by situations, such
as in Zimbabwe, where the UNHCR protection officer sits on the eligibility
committee. While the use of NGOs to perform limited protection roles (ie provision of
legal advice to asylum-seekers) may mitigate some of protection problems faced
by refugees, the UNHCR must not neglect its statutory protection role. In the
final analysis the UNHCR is not answerable to host governments, but to the
international community and to refugees themselves. To be fair, however, there
is an urgent need to increase the funding allocated to the protection wing of
the UNHCR, and increased recognition on the part of donors of the importance of
protection issues. 9. The Role of Non-Governmental Human Rights
Organizations An enormous gap, both in conception and practice, exists between the
protection of internationally recognized human rights standards and the
protection of refugee rights. This gap is noticeable in the OAU, which has
separate treaties and institutions dealing with human rights and refugee issues,
in the UNHCR, and in NGOs concerned with human rights. Yet "refugee" and
"relief" organizations are often intimately engaged in human rights activities.
For example, such organizations have taken measures to protect the rights of
vulnerable sectors of the refugee population, such as women and children.
Furthermore, these organizations are also instrumental in providing information
to refugees about their rights. The limited role of human rights NGOs in the defense of refugee rights is
also evident among major intergovernmental organizations, who have been slow to
bridge the gap between human rights and refugee rights. Taken together with the
relatively recent emergence of may African human rights NGOs, the often remote
location of refugee populations, and the assumption on the part of may NGOs that
the OAU Convention's group eligibility provisions protect refugees from human
rights violations, it is not surprising that refugee rights are a low priority
for most African NGOs. However, human rights NGOs have an important and distinct contribution to
make to the defense of refugee rights. They can provide advice and legal
representation in the absence of UNHCR assistance, they can research and
document abuses against refugees in order to raise public awareness, thy can try
to sensitize local populations to refugee rights as a countermeasure against
rising xenophobia, and they can use international law and international
complaints procedures where appropriate. Several African NGOs active in refugee
rights issues, such as the Civil Liberties Organization in Nigeria and the
Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, have done effective
work in the arena of refugee rights which may act as useful models for other
NGOs. Although the massive exodus of Rwandese refugees occurred after the LCHR had
completed its fieldwork, the major problems concerning the protection of those
escaping the violence of Rwanda underlines the report's main findings and places
some of the issues discussed therein in sharp relief. Some of these problems
include: contradictions inherent in the group eligibility process, the lack of
physical protection in the refugee camps (stemming in part from the inability of
host governments to provide adequate protection), faulty structures of food
distribution, and flaws in conditions of voluntary repatriation. In the case of Rwanda, the group eligibility process masked the fact that
among those granted protection were persons who were involved in the massacre
and killing of others, as well as the planning to commit genocide. The inability
of the various host governments involved to enforce the relevant international
and regional standards prohibiting protection for such individuals created
enormous problems for Rwanda refugees in terms of physical security. The failure
on the part of host governments and the UNHCR to separate the ousted government
and army from refugees meant that former Hutu government officials were allowed
to exert political, often violent, control over refugees in the camps. This
security problem was exacerbated by the ease with which ousted militiamen
entered host countries with their weapons. As in other cases outlined in chapter 4, the protection of Rwandese refugees
was seriously undermined by the abusive practices of host security forces, as
well as the complicity of host governments in the original disruptive political
crisis in Rwanda. For example, the freedom with which the exiled
political/military leadership were allowed to operate in the Zairian and
Tanzanian camps meant that they were able to commandeer the food distribution
structures to achieve political goals through intimidation and coercion. As a
potential solution, aid agencies might consider using refugee women as the
center of any food distribution system. The repatriation of Rwandese refugees is
clearly a sensitive matter that must take into careful consideration
all issues relevant to the safety and welfare of returning refugees.
In the UN's haste to repatriate Rwandese refugees, the specialized
obligation of the UNHCR to protect refugees must not be subsumed by
the exigencies of humanitarian assistance. In the face of vociferous
propaganda from parties to the conflict, the UNHCR must establish
the real conditions of security for returning refugees, since
further instability will be the likely result if there is not
adequate preparations made for the protection of the rights of
returning refugees. The LCHR is skeptical about the efficacy of
providing safe havens or peace corridors for Rwandese refugees,
given the degree of commitment of resources that would be required
from the UN, and the fact that refugee populations in safe havens in
other situations (ie Bosnia) have sometimes become the target of
internecine attacks. | |||||||||
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